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TIME, JUDGMENT, AND COMPETITIVE SPIRITUALITY: 
A READING OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF PURGATORY 
JOHN E. THIEL 
Why has purgatory virtually disappeared from Catholic belief and 
practice since Vatican II? A competitive spirituality, gravitating 
around the religious vocation of ascetics from the late Middle Ages, 
enabled the doctrine by extending the temporal horizon within 
which God's favorable judgment could be secured, first, in the life-
long practice of ascetics in their spiritual competition with martyrs, 
and then into a supernatural time required for laypersons and as-
cetics who could not meet the standard set by saintly ascetics. The 
loss of this competitive spirituality after Vatican II led to the loss of 
belief in purgatory and devotional practice surrounding it. 
FOR MANY CATHOLICS IN THE POSTCONCILIAR CHURCH purgatory has fallen off the eschatological map. It is difficult to know exactly why 
this has occurred. One reasonable explanation might run along the follow-
ing lines. The theological and pastoral reception of the Second Vatican 
Council highlighted the power of God's grace in bringing believers to salva-
tion, and that emphasis undermined the detailed accounting of personal virtue 
and sin in the Tridentine merit system. This accent on the graciousness of 
divine love brought about a seismic shift in Catholic belief and practice. Con-
servatives in the Church would continue the explanation by concluding that 
the postconciliar theology of God's infinite mercy and compassion tragi-
cally eclipsed the preconciliar sense of the power of personal sin. This 
diminishment of the sense of sin has had repercussions for a host of other 
mutually related beliefs and practices that explain the contemporary indif-
ference toward purgatory. The diminishment of the sense of personal sin 
has been attended by a transformed understanding of the saintly life as an 
epiphany of virtue, though not virtue achieved through difficult struggle 
with sin. The diminishment of the sense of personal sin has led to the 
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virtual disappearance of the sacrament of penance in popular Catholic 
practice, a change in religious behavior that reflects the loss of a belief in 
the rigor of divine judgment. And since purgatory is about judgment, it is 
hardly surprising that the doctrine of purgatory has largely disappeared 
from Catholic belief and practice. 
This article, though, offers a somewhat different explanation for the 
disappearance of purgatory in contemporary Catholic belief and practice, 
and one that does not reduce its disappearance to the tragic. This expla-
nation will depend on an argument that I offer in these pages for the 
development of the doctrine of purgatory. My purpose is to reflect on the 
development of the doctrine of purgatory in order to appreciate the work-
ings of judgment in the Catholic tradition. I will not attempt a theological 
retrieval of the doctrine of purgatory. I am entirely open to the possibility 
that there is value in such a retrieval, but that is not my project here. 
Instead, the doctrine of purgatory will serve as a resource for elucidating 
the anxieties and hopes that attend the Catholic belief in divine judgment. 
I readily concede at the outset that my argument will not please profes-
sional historians. It is sweeping in its historical scope, speculative in its 
judgments, and leads, in the end, to constructive conclusions. The story 
I tell will have historical contours, and its main characters will be Catholic 
Christians who have lived their lives in the tradition's two, broad voca-
tions—ascetics and laypersons. I begin the story by considering the recent 
revival of scholarly interest in purgatory that has been prompted by the 
work of Jacques Le Goff. 
EXPLAINING PURGATORY 
No study has had a greater influence on our understanding of the 
development of purgatory as a Catholic belief than Jacques Le Goff's 
The Birth of Purgatory (1981).1 Le Goff argues that purgatory came into 
full bloom as a Catholic belief and doctrine rather late, in the twelfth 
century. Established at that time as a "third place" in the afterlife along 
with heaven and hell, purgatory became "an intermediary other world in 
which some of the dead were subjected to a trial that could be shortened 
by the prayers, by the spiritual aid of the living."2 Hints of such beliefs 
abound in the earlier tradition, whether in affirmations of otherworldly 
purgation or in ancient accounts of near-death experiences in which the 
1
 Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1984). For critical assessments of this work see Graham 
Robert Edwards, "Purgatory: 'Birth' or Evolution?" Journal of Ecclesiastical His-
tory 36 (1985) 634-46; and Brian Patrick McGuire, "Purgatory, the Communion of 
the Saints, and Medieval Change," Viator 20 (1989) 61-84. 
2
 Le Goff, Birth of Purgatory 4. 
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believer is conducted on a journey through hell so that, chastened by the 
terrible sight, he or she can regard earthly life as an opportunity for re-
pentance. But, for Le Goff, nothing in the earlier tradition compares with 
the elaboration of purgatory in the religious imagination of twelfth-century 
Europe. Purgatory not only achieved specificity as a "third place" but also 
took shape in a detailed theology of retribution, sacrifice, penalties, par-
dons, and spiritual exchange among the dead and the living. Purgatory has 
continued to capture the Catholic imagination until very recently, achiev-
ing doctrinal definition in the late medieval period and enjoying "a more 
ample existence... in the leading Catholic styles of the fifteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries." Since Le Goff concedes that "Purgatory is rooted in 
the theology of the post-Tridentine catechism,"3 he might have carried this 
period of flourishing to the eve of Vatican II, in the aftermath of which 
belief in purgatory has all but disappeared. 
Central to Le Goff s thesis is his attribution of the twelfth-century birth 
of purgatory to social-historical causes. Cities began to rise in Europe at 
this time, creating a third, social group of merchants alongside the tradi-
tional two of empowered nobles and clergy, on the one hand, and the 
powerless peasantry, on the other. The binary eschatological destinies of 
heaven and hell were now imaginatively supplemented by a third, tempo-
rary destination that projected the new intermediate social group into the 
afterlife, along with all the social ambiguity of future success and failure 
that typified the life of the new merchant group. In Le Goff's words: 
"between the great (lay and ecclesiastic) and the small (rural and urban 
workers) an intermediate category had been born, namely, the 'bourgeois,' 
who formed a group so diverse that I prefer not to speak of it as a class."4 
Le Goff does not reduce the birth of purgatory to the single cause of social 
stratification in the urban development of the high Middle Ages. He insists 
that it would be absurd to argue that "the bourgeoisie created Purgatory, 
or that Purgatory in one way or another derived from the bourgeoisie, 
assuming a bourgeoisie even existed at the time."5 Rather, he makes the 
more modest or, as he calls it, "hypothetical" interpretation that medieval 
men and women could only think and imagine in terms of their social and 
economic structures, and that dramatic changes in these structures could 
not help but be reflected in their thinking about life after death. It is 
difficult to disagree with Le Goff on this point, at least as a partial expla-
nation of the development of this doctrine. 
As an Annales historian, Le Goff is strongly committed to social histo-
riography. And yet, in spite of this commitment, he troubles over the 
3
 Ibid. 357. 4 Ibid. 226. 
5
 Ibid. 
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adequacy of this explanatory approach in the book's concluding pages. He 
admits that his argument has made purgatory the "key component" in 
explaining the medieval system of ideas. Purgatory holds this central place 
in his argument since, in his judgment, it captures something new in the 
developing structure of late medieval society. Early medieval thinking 
moved in a binary framework that reflected the feudal social division of 
rich and poor, empowered and disempowered. The twelfth century wit-
nessed a shift to a trinary mode of thinking that mirrored the appearance 
of the new merchant class, and that valorized purgatory in an otherworldly 
landscape that previously had highlighted the eternal binaries of heaven 
and hell. The newness of an elaborate theology of purgatory in the later 
Middle Ages represented the newness of the nascent urban culture and 
accounts for the centrality of purgatory in Le Goff's social-historical ex-
planation. But, Le Goff wonders, "isn't it possible that the real energizing 
and organizing force of the system lay not in Purgatory but in Heaven?" 
Even though the sources portray purgatory as a place of suffering, perhaps 
"Purgatory's center of gravity may have shifted so far toward Paradise as 
to make the desire for Heaven the energizing force of Christian doctrine."6 
Wondering next about the adequacy of his account from the opposite 
direction, Le Goff questions whether belief in purgatory developed as it did 
in order for "the Church to preserve the belief in Hell everlasting" by 
"introducing a temporary Purgatory mainly to throw the inextinguishable 
fires of Hell into sharp relief."7 
These are challenging questions to raise at the end of a rather ardent 
argument, and they show Le Goff's admirable capacity for self-criticism. Le 
Goff does not answer these questions, nor does he pose them only to 
dismiss them and reclaim the explanatory power of his argument. His book 
ends with the questions left standing, testimonies to what he describes as 
his nagging anxiety about the adequacy of his argument.8 And this is a 
productive anxiety indeed. Had Le Goff pursued these questions and ar-
gued in heavenly or hellish directions, one expects that he would have 
constructed theses that resembled the one advanced in the book he did 
write, his scholarly mindset and method unswervingly committed to social 
historiography. But his questions also delimit the boundaries of social-
historical explanation by highlighting the importance of religious emotions 
in a system of doctrine, and so in any attempt at historical explanation. 
Perhaps, Le Goff considers, the yearning for heaven or the fear of hell are 
more central to Christian concern about the otherworld than purgatory 
itself, and perhaps purgatory is but a derivative way of speaking about the 
yearning for heaven or the fear of hell, or possibly even both! 
6
 Ibid. 358. 7 Ibid. 359. 
8
 Ibid. 358. 
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Religious emotions like yearning and fear, of course, always unfold in 
determinate social-historical circumstances that mold them in complex 
ways, and so a more complete study of these emotions would need to 
explain the particular cultural setting that produced them. And yet, this 
same observation applies, mutatis mutandis, to a predominantly social-
historical explanation. Even though religious beliefs and practices can be 
explained as a function of social-historical causes, they, in turn, can pro-
duce powerful religious emotions whose consistent meaning contributes to 
the integrity of an identifiable religious tradition. As much as these mean-
ingful emotions are particularized by time, place, and circumstance, they 
may shape the determinate historical conditions within which they appear 
and to an extent that obliges the interpreter to consider the causal conse-
quences of their consistent meaning over time. 
I now consider this point with respect to purgatory. "Purgatory-like" 
beliefs have flourished throughout Christian history, especially in Latin 
Christianity, in what eventually came to be identified as the Roman Catho-
lic tradition, and even in the popular culture where these beliefs have had 
currency. Origen's third-century belief in earthly life as successive reincar-
nations in which the soul is gradually educated to conformity with the 
divine will; Augustine's fifth-century mention of a supernatural, purifying 
fire in the City of God; Gregory the Great's seventh-century stories of 
near-death experiences in which believers return to life after experiencing 
a vision of hell so that their sins could be purged by renewed moral effort 
in this life; Catherine of Genoa's classical 16th-century account of the late 
medieval theology of purgatory as an otherworldly third place; Le Goff's 
observation that this classical theme saw variations in a "Counter Refor-
mation Purgatory,... a baroque Purgatory, a romantic Purgatory, and a 
Sulpician Purgatory";9 and the widespread practice of purgatorial interces-
sion in Tridentine Catholicism in general to the eve of Vatican II all testify 
to the consistent appearance of purgatory-like beliefs in the tradition. If 
one assumes that this consistent appearance expresses at least the possi-
bility of consistent and meaningful religious emotions, then the interpreter 
cannot ignore that possibility in proposing historical explanations. Any 
effort to explain why these purgatorial beliefs have persisted throughout 
the tradition is susceptible to the same kind of reductionism about which 
9
 Ibid. 357. For a comprehensive account of purgatorial belief in historical per-
spective, see Albert Michel, "Purgatoire," in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique: 
Contenant l'exposé des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur 
histoire, éd. A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, vol. 13/1 (Paris: Letouzey, 1936) 1163-
1326. 
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Le Goff worried in his approach. Moreover, social-historical criticism 
rightly has made us wary of essentialist tendencies in homologous expla-
nation. Nevertheless, the abiding expression of the same kinds of religious 
hopes and fears begs for explanation at the level of the historically similar, 
just as much as beliefs marked by time and place beg for explanation at the 
level of the historically different. 
In the pages that follow, I explore how the consistent appearance of the 
religious emotion of anxiety, fueled by competition for heaven between 
and among martyrs, ascetics, and laypersons, does much to account for the 
development of the doctrine of purgatory in the Catholic tradition. I do not 
consider this perspective on the development of the doctrine to be exhaus-
tive. I offer the argument presented here only as another layer of expla-
nation that, if credible, may complement the many recent scholarly ac-
counts of the doctrine of purgatory. 
ESCHATOLOGICAL ANXIETY 
Purgatory is not explicitly mentioned among the four "last things"— 
death, judgment, heaven, and hell. But purgatory is entirely about the 
judgment that believers expect to face in the afterlife as a consequence of 
their lives here and now. The first shades of belief in what later developed 
into the medieval doctrine of purgatory appear as early as Augustine's 
fifth-century speculations about judgment in the City of God. In Book 21, 
the North African bishop opines that "not all men who endure temporal 
pains after death come into those eternal punishments, which are to come 
after that judgment. Some, in fact, will receive forgiveness in the world to 
come for what is not forgiven in this . . . so that they may not be punished 
with the eternal chastisement of the world to come."10 This early concep-
tion links purgation to the judgment that God has made on those who 
suffer otherworldly pain. But judgment, in Christian belief, is not confined 
to supernatural purgation. Judgment has been a matter of concern from the 
tradition's earliest days, no doubt because it assesses the believer's con-
summate relationship to God, and so the believer's eternal destiny. 
The early Christian conception of judgment was bound up with the 
zealous belief in Jesus' imminent return to the world as eschatological 
judge. Christian hope in this saving event drew on the religious energies of 
the Jewish apocalyptic tradition, which may have inspired the preaching of 
10
 Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, trans. Henry Scow-
croft Bettenson, intro. John O'Meara (New York: Penguin, 1984) 990-91 (Book 
21.13). In Book 21.26, Augustine speaks of a purifying fire as the cause of the 
otherworldly pain of purgation, an idea he mentions in several of his works. See 
Joseph Ntedika, L'évolution de la doctrine du purgatoire chez Saint Augustin (Paris: 
Études Augustiniennes, 1966). 
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Jesus himself. One possible textual candidate for this influence is the 
Jewish Book of Daniel, whose vision of the Son of Man "coming with the 
clouds of heaven" (Dan 7:13) captured first-century Christian imagination 
on the manner of Jesus' return. Daniel sees the end-time as God's judg-
ment on his people that will "bring some to everlasting life, and some to 
everlasting contempt" (Dan 12:2), a judgment of division that would later 
appear prominently in the Gospel of Matthew. The theology of the Q 
material, written or orally transmitted sayings of Jesus on the responsibility 
of discipleship, highlights the judgment that early Christians expected to 
accompany the coming of God's kingdom. Jesus' exhortations to virtue of 
the highest order in the Q sayings make impending judgment a horizon 
before which Christian commitment finally will be proved. Even though 
Matthew and Luke (75-85 CE) wove the Q material into larger gospel 
frameworks that tempered its apocalyptic fervor, they yet followed Q in 
making the judging expectations of Jesus the criterion of virtuous action for 
their Christian communities. These late first-century churches could aspire 
to ethical heights that required even the love of one's enemies (Mt 5:44; Lk 
6:27), believing as they did that such virtue was an obligation for those who 
lived in an already immanent kingdom of God. 
The early church defined the criterion of judgment not only by the 
teaching of Jesus but also by the martyrs' extraordinary example of Christie 
imitation. The Book of Revelation, written around 100 CE, provides early 
testimony of the martyrs' privileged place in the apocalyptic drama. As the 
events of the end-time unfold, John sees the "souls of those beheaded for 
their testimony to Jesus and for the Word of God" standing before those 
enthroned and "given authority to judge." The martyrs are vindicated for 
their sacrifice by sharing in the "first resurrection," by which they "came to 
life and reigned with Christ a thousand years" (Rev 20:4, 5). Their imme-
diate judgment and salvation distinguishes them from other believers. As 
"blessed and holy" and as "priests of God and of Christ," the martyrs 
provided a measure in the late first-century church of the most authentic 
discipleship to which believers might aspire in their own appearance before 
the Judge who would soon vanquish the powers of the world. 
It is interesting to speculate about what sort of emotions were stirred in 
the earliest Christians by this expectation of judgment upon the return of 
Christ. Paul, writing in the middle years of the first century, chastises 
members of the Christian community in Rome forjudging each other when 
it is only God's place to judge. "For we will all stand before the judgment 
seat of God," he writes, where "each of us will be accountable to God" 
(Rom 14:10, 12). And yet Paul's strong doctrine of grace seems to expect 
the parousia as an irresistible wave of grace that will bring those baptized 
in Christ to heavenly bliss in spite of their utter sinfulness. For Paul, human 
sinfulness is as inescapable as the death that he believes sin causes (Rom 
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5:12). Before the Jewish Law, all are judged unfavorably since no deed that 
issues from human nature can elude self-interest and vanity. "I can will 
what is right," Paul concedes, "but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good 
I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do" (Rom 7:18-19). This Pauline 
style of faith, then, takes for granted that God's judgment on every human 
life, and, even more, on every human deed requires the verdict of condem-
nation (Rom 5:16). All human beings deserve a death that is final and from 
which there is no rescue. In Paul's view, God's love and mercy are not 
beholden to this just verdict but instead break it to pieces. Out of the 
rubble of sin, death, and condemnation, God brings the surprising and 
undeserved gift of eternal life in the resurrection of Christ from the dead, 
which, Paul believes, brings in turn the gift of resurrected life to believers 
(1 Cor 15:12-19). Since Paul's audience comprises newly baptized Chris-
tians who have experienced this gift of eternal life, his letters testify con-
sistently to the victory of grace, even to the point that they make no 
mention of final condemnation or hell. The Pauline style of faith under-
stands the resurrection of Christ to have annulled God's righteous verdict 
of condemnation on human sin, and so the emotion that characterizes its 
belief before the coming judgment is gratitude.11 
The style of faith that we find in the Synoptic Gospels of Mark, Matthew, 
and Luke is quite different, as is the range of emotions it likely evoked in 
believers. Here, the grace of God that breaks into the world in the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus expects the proof of discipleship in deeds 
that imitate the Savior's life and by which the believer will be judged. 
Judgment in this style of faith does not move in the trajectory of Pauline 
thought. God's judgment presupposes human responsibility not only for sin 
but also for virtue. Moreover, judgment in this style of faith highlights the 
believer's active decision before the alternatives of moral achievement or 
moral failure, and ultimately before the eschatological destinies of heav-
enly glory or infernal condemnation. Even though we find these beliefs 
about judgment in all three Synoptic Gospels, they are so pointedly ex-
pressed in Matthew that I will name this style of faith "Matthean." In words 
that echo the eschatological sensibilities of Q, Matthew conveys this sense 
of judgment sharply in the reproach Jesus brings on the cities that fail to 
repent before his "deeds of power": "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, 
Bethsaida! For if the deeds of power done in you had been done in Tyre 
and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But 
I tell you, on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for Tyre and 
Sidon than for you. And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? 
11
 Paul, of course, assumes that undeserved grace brings the believer to ethical 
responsibility that flourishes in virtuous deeds. See, for example, 1 Cor 9:24-27; 2 
Cor 5:9-10; Gal 6:7-10. 
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No, you will be brought down to Hades" (Mt 11:21-23). For Matthew, this 
judgment of division—in Jesus' words—cannot be separated from the re-
turn of the Son of Man: "'For as the lightening comes from the east and 
flashes as far as the west, so will be the coming of the Son of Man Then 
two will be in the field; one will be taken and one will be left. Two women 
will be grinding meal together; one will be taken and one will be left. Keep 
awake therefore, for you do not know on what day your Lord is coming'" 
(Mt 24:27, 40-42). 
Matthew completes this vision of eschatological division in a passage that 
exerted a profound influence on Christian belief in the Last Judgment. 
Continuing to explain the end-times to his disciples, Matthew's Jesus says: 
"'When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, 
then he will sit on the throne of his glory. All the nations will be gathered 
before him, and he will separate people one from another as a shepherd 
separates the sheep from the goats, and he will put the sheep at his right 
hand and the goats at the left" (Mt 25:31-33). This judgment is rendered on 
the fruits of discipleship. Those who have earned the crown of heaven fed 
the hungry, gave drink to the thirsty, welcomed the stranger, clothed the 
naked, cared for the sick, and visited the imprisoned (Mt 25:35-36). Jesus 
condemns those who did not accomplish these deeds to "the eternal fire 
prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mt 25:41). This same logic of divi-
sion appears in Mark and Luke to the extent that Jesus calls believers to a 
discipleship of deeds measured by the sacrifice of the cross, a standard that 
Jesus had defined in his own saving death and that each martyr profoundly 
imitated in the act of becoming a saint. 
The Matthean style of faith, no doubt, was satisfying to believers since it 
became the majority belief of the Christian tradition. But the satisfaction it 
brought also occasioned a certain kind of concern that I call "eschatological 
anxiety." By this term I mean emotional consternation about one's eternal 
destiny, which, in a Christian context, amounts to worry about the final 
integrity of one's life, about its ultimate meaningfulness or meaningless-
ness, about its consummate happiness or desolation. This anxiety emerges 
in the prospect of a judgment before God in which one's deeds and mis-
deeds truly matter. As already noted, the Pauline style of faith assumes that 
all human deeds are wanting. Sin seeps so deeply into every natural act that 
there is no natural virtue. But the Matthean style of faith presupposes the 
believer's active responsibility before real alternatives in eternal destiny. 
Believers in this style of faith understand their acts of discipleship to be 
energized by the grace of Christ. Perseverance on the gospel's difficult road 
cannot be credited to human powers alone. And yet, human initiative 
makes a distinct contribution to the journey of salvation, and without it 
there is no righteousness before the divine judge. That such action is mea-
sured by the high standards provided by the ethical commands of Jesus in 
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Scripture, his passion and death, and the martyr's heroic example of imi-
tation—and all before the prospect of Christ's imminent return as judge— 
certainly stirred anxiety among early believers whose ethical performance 
fell short of their martyred peers, an anxious group of nearly all.12 
Christian faith in the Late Antique world developed along the lines of 
this Matthean style of faith, proliferating as a religious perspective that 
Peter Brown has called the "peccatization" of the world.13 As the apoca-
lyptic expectations of the first century receded, and, even more, as the age 
of persecution ended and Christianity entered the ordinary time of late 
Roman Antiquity, judgment took shape in the believer's sense of sin and 
in the need of forgiveness before God's righteousness. By the fifth century, 
Brown argues, Christians came to be especially concerned about the 
"peccata levia, the day-to-day sins"14 of those who were not blatantly saints 
and not blatantly the damned, that is, the Christian masses who were 
12
 All the talk here of Paul and Matthew as representative of two styles of early 
Christian faith raises questions about how the Gospel of John compares. There are, 
of course, many styles of first-century Christian faith. The literary evidence suggests 
that there are at least as many as there are texts. The Gospel of John is one 
important example that had a prominent influence on the later tradition, especially 
through its Christology of préexistence. John, however, was far less influential on 
the later tradition than Matthew with respect to the issues of discipleship and 
judgment. Like Paul, John highlights the power of God's grace in a way that draws 
his attention away from the theme of virtuous responsibility. On this point see Alan 
E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and 
Early Christian Worlds (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1993) 224-27. John's 
theology of grace thus tended to obviate a rigorous ethic of discipleship, the likes 
of which we find in the Gospel of Matthew. Much in the manner that the Chris-
tology of the Synoptic Gospels was absorbed into John's high Christology of pré-
existence in the tradition's later, uncritical readings of the New Testament, John 
was absorbed into the Matthean theology of discipleship and divine judgment. I 
have distinguished only two styles of Christian faith—Pauline and Matthean—on 
the basis of their history of effects on the Christian tradition. 
13
 Peter Brown, "The Decline of the Empire of God: Amnesty, Penance, and the 
Afterlife from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages," in Last Things: Death and the 
Apocalypse in the Middle Ages, ed. Carol Walker Bynum and Paul Freedman 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2000) 58. 
14
 Ibid. 43. Unlike Le Goff, Andreas Merkt is willing to consider the origins of 
purgatory in a host of Late Antique Christian beliefs, among them Brown's notion 
of the peccata levia. Merkt finds this idea first in Cyprian's willingness to conceive 
the church not simply as a community of the perfect but as a community that 
embraced the repentant sinner. This ecclesiology defined a category of Christians 
who were neither certainly saved nor certainly lost, and which Augustine came to 
call the "not very good and not very bad." Merkt argues that this third category of 
believers, perched in the salvational hierarchy between the martyrs and the 
damned, provided a seedbed for the growth of purgatory. See Andreas Merkt, Das 
Fegfeuer: Entstehung und Funktion einer Idee (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, 2005) 65-68. 
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increasingly visible in the emerging feudal world. All the baptized, whether 
monastic or lay, imagined the Christian life as an extended purification of 
the soul in preparation for its eschatological encounter with God. Even 
though grace was assumed to be at work in the believer's salvation, "the 
center of gravity of the imaginative structure associated with the notion of 
purification rested heavily on the individual and on his or her ability to take 
on full responsibility for his or her own healing."15 The late Roman legal 
system provided a cultural context in which the Matthean style of faith 
could more exactly take account of every sin and measure the virtuous 
recompense owed God, a calculation that mirrored the secular amnesty 
that violators of imperial law sought from the emperor. Brown points out 
that this understanding of the Christian life as an accounting for sin valo-
rized personal death as the moment of eschatological encounter with God. 
"Neither in late antiquity nor in the early middle ages," he avers, "should 
we underestimate the silent pressure exercised on all Christians by the 
inscrutable anomaly of death In the Christian imagination, the moment 
of death was an exact reflection, in miniature, of the terror of the Last 
Judgment."16 
It is not surprising that personal death would gain prominence as the 
moment of eschatological encounter with God. This shift reflected the 
cultural assimilation of Christianity into Mediterranean society, its em-
brace of the day-to-day life of the civic realm where, as Brown points out, 
the believer struggled constantly to make amends for his or her day-to-day 
sins. Christian life became quotidian for a host of reasons—the end of 
persecution, the rise of the institutional church, and the alliance of political 
and ecclesiastical authorities. But we should not overlook the fact that 
Christian life also became quotidian because the imminent apocalypse ex-
pected by the earliest Christians did not occur. In response, Christians 
15
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retheologized their religious worldview, particularly with respect to the 
time of judgment. The return of Christ was relegated to a more distant 
future and invested with the same communal proportions of judgment that 
first-century Christians had expected soon. This Last Judgment was distin-
guished from the particular judgment that each believer would face at the 
time of death as a disembodied soul, a judgment in which the body would 
share when it was miraculously resurrected and united with the soul on the 
last day. Personal death replaced the first-century expectation of the apoca-
lypse as the catalyst of eschatological anxiety. Most importantly, the belief 
in a particular judgment immediately after death quotidianized judgment 
by enveloping it in the ordinariness of death. As much as the hour of one's 
own death became religiously extraordinary, "fearful, or simply awe-
inspiring"17 as the moment of appearance before the divine judge, the 
ordinariness of death as a human event, witnessed often in the deaths of 
others, wove judgment into the daily circumstances of life. To the degree 
that the moment of death was invested with the believer's portfolio of 
discipleship, judgment made its way back in time into the believer's every 
sinful and virtuous deed. 
Time thus became saturated with judgment as the concern for eternal 
destiny was extended not only forward, so to speak, from a particular to a 
reiterated Last Judgment, but also backward into every moment in the 
believer's life. Unfolding ordinarily in a de-apocalypticized temporality, 
judgment became an ongoing event in a protracted period of time in which 
every word and deed entered into the balance of divine justice. As I will 
show, this new Christian sensibility on time and judgment provided a set-
ting for the development of the doctrine of purgatory in the late Middle 
Ages. 
COPING WITH THE MARTYRS 
The cult of the saints in the Late Antique world is usually explained as 
a religious practice shaped by the culture of patronage that flourished in 
Mediterranean society.18 The veneration that believers accorded the saints 
mirrored the bonds of the patron-client relationship, its ties of power and 
need and its exchange of favors now transferred into the currency of the 
supernatural and the believer's desire for resurrected life. As a coda to this 
customary explanation one might also consider how the rise of the cult of 
17
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the saints contributed to the domestication of judgment and constituted an 
interesting site for the negotiation of eschatological anxiety in the early 
church. 
The martyrs continued to provide the standard for Christian virtue 
throughout the age of persecution, their faithful deaths defining the earliest 
Christian understanding of the saint. The delay of the parousia, however, 
led Christians to redefine their conception of judgment and the normativity 
of saintly imitation. As noted above, the fact that Christ had not returned 
required the delay of the eschaton into a more distant future. The church 
relinquished the Book of Revelation's idea of a "first resurrection" of the 
saints into a chiliastic reign of Christ for 1,000 years, a loss that strength-
ened the belief in heavenly life after death that appeared in the tradition as 
early as Paul's letters. A changed notion of the "first resurrection" of the 
martyrs, though, continued to resonate in the practice of burial ad sonetos. 
Judging the martyr's physical remains to be sacred, Christians of the early 
centuries began the practice of regarding their burial places as holy ground, 
sanctified by the martyr's charismatic presence. The shrine became the 
destination of pilgrimage, a place to petition the saint for favors that kept 
deathliness at bay, and also a burial ground for the community's beloved 
dead. Since the martyr had already passed through judgment and gained 
divine favor, believers buried their dead in proximity to the saint in the 
hope that the ordinary faithful would share in the martyr's "first resurrec-
tion,"19 now conceived as the privilege the martyr would enjoy in being 
raised to physical wholeness first of all on the last day. The practice of 
making the shrines into cemeteries assured the physical closeness of the 
dead to the saint on the Day of Judgment, an intimacy that, through the 
power of grace and ample hope, would allow the ordinary believer to 
participate in the martyr's most favorable judgment. 
We might think of this practice, centered in the authority of the martyr's 
judgment, as a further domestication of eschatology. The practice of burial 
ad sanctos conceded the delay that Christians had come to expect in the 
approach of the end-time, nearness to the relics serving as a substitute for 
what first-century Christians believed to be the nearness of a parousia 
brought by Christ himself. Christians continued this domestication of es-
chatology by depositing the relics of the saints into the newly built churches 
of the fourth and fifth centuries. The relative permanence of the new 
structures, which reflected an ecclesiology of accommodation to the new 
era, testified to the distance of the eschaton and to the routinization of the 
sacred in ordinary time. And as the life of the church was extended into a 
future that led all the way to the distant eschaton, a premium began to be 
19
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placed on the Christian life as a more limited horizon of years within which 
believers struggled to act virtuously in order to make recompense for the 
failure of sin. Within this more compact and personalized eschatology, the 
believer's death now became the focal point of judgment, a death packed 
with all the moments of life that fell under the divine scrutiny and for which 
the believer was held accountable. 
Christian life thus became a duration for the exercise of virtue and the 
avoidance of sin, a limited time charged with eternal consequences. The 
cult of the saints was an acknowledgment on the part of the faithful that a 
few Christians—indeed very few—had used their time extraordinarily well. 
Believers who came in need to the saints knew that they, the ordinary, were 
among the many whose sin outweighed their virtuous deeds. The difference 
between the saint, as one of the few, and the sinner, as one of the many, 
animated the cult. The martyr's virtuous difference as an extraordinary 
imitator of the Savior availed the power of eternal life to believers. The 
difference of the martyr's favorable judgment, accessible to the believer 
through the martyr's intercession, was a remarkable comfort to the needy 
faithful who could share in the saint's exceptional difference. But the mar-
tyr's difference also stood as a threatening measure of what a believer's life 
could be. The martyr's death was the consummate act of discipleship 
since it mirrored Jesus' death on the cross, a standard of virtue that few 
Christians could, or were willing to, match during the persecution. After 
the persecution ended in 313 CE, the martyr's achievement was placed 
beyond the possible circumstances of discipleship, securing the authority of 
the martyr's judgment throughout the tradition. This made the martyr as 
much a source of eschatological anxiety as a source of eschatological com-
fort. The martyr's favorable judgment by God was one in which believers 
could participate through the martyr's cult. But it was also a judgment on 
the lives of believers that stirred fears about their own judgment. 
It would be interesting to consider the rise of Christian asceticism from 
the turn of the fourth century as a way of negotiating the eschatological 
anxiety incited by the martyr's judgment. At one level, the notion of the 
ascetic as holy person was a response to the acculturation of Christianity. 
The martyr's sacrifice exhausted the early notion of the saint. As the age of 
persecution ended and the Roman authorities stopped making martyrs, 
Christians sought an alternative understanding of saintly imitation and 
found it in the nascent ascetical movement. Ascetical men and women 
imitated Jesus by willing the sufferings of his passion into their bodies and, 
by doing so, believed that they shared in his saving atonement in an ex-
traordinary way. Unlike the martyrs, though, the ascetics carried their 
imitation to a point far short of death. Since the society in which they lived 
was not hostile to their religious endeavors, martyrdom was not an option. 
Indeed, as Christian belief provided a matrix of meaning for medieval 
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society, ascetics were celebrated as holy persons from whom the ranks of 
the new saints were drawn, the most accomplished ascetics earning the 
crown of exceptional holiness. But as much as ascetics were revered for the 
vows they took and strove daily to keep, their religious achievements flour-
ished under the shadow of the earlier ideal of sainthood. Even the most 
devoted consecrated lives that ordinary believers acclaimed still struggled 
to justify themselves before the martyr's most favorable judgment. Two 
well-known examples from the hagiographical tradition make this point. 
In Athanasius's Life of Antony, we see an early expression of this es-
chatological anxiety. Written shortly after Antony's death in 356, the text 
records the ascetical achievements of one of the first and certainly one of 
the the most revered Egyptian monks. Athanasius portrays Antony's life-
long denunciation of fleshly desire as a context for his devoted contempla-
tion of God. At every turn in this difficult journey, Antony faced tempta-
tions of the mind and the body, and even physical beatings at the hands of 
the devil, who was intent on bringing the monk to ruin. Antony's steadfast 
commitment to the ascetical life led his fellow Christians to regard him as 
a living saint. Some expressed their admiration by following his example 
directly, retreating to the desert to live the hermit's life. Others simply 
wanted to be near him, as though sharing his physical presence placed them 
in the ambit of sacred power. In the narrative, this pious attention from the 
faithful proved a distraction to Antony, who fled from all this enthusiastic 
notice by making an abandoned fortress his monastic cell and living in it 
alone for 20 years. The faithful were undeterred by Antony's desire for 
solitude and kept watch outside the fortress, initially content just to be near 
the holy man. But eventually his admirers grew impatient and "tore down 
and forcefully removed the fortress door." Antony, Athanasius writes, 
"came forth as though from some shrine, having been led into divine 
mysteries and inspired by God." He continues: 
And when they beheld him, they were amazed to see that his body had maintained 
its former condition, neither fat from lack of exercise, nor emaciated from fasting 
and combat with demons, but was just as they had known him prior to his with-
drawal. The state of his soul was one of purity He maintained utter equilibrium, 
like one guided by reason and steadfast in that which accords with nature.20 
And "through him," Athanasius testifies, "the Lord healed many of those 
present who suffered from bodily ailments; others he purged of de-
mons He consoled many who mourned, and others hostile to each 
other he reconciled in friendship."21 
20
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Athanasius clearly draws connections here between Jesus' resurrection 
and Antony's appearance to the crowd. Antony's ascetical regimen seems 
already to have produced a resurrected body in this life, one that has 
banished the traits of deathliness and that, by presence alone, is a conveyer 
of graceful, healing power. Antony is Christ-like by virtue of an extraor-
dinary discipleship forged in ascetical sacrifice. But even though this scene 
offers imaginative allusions to Jesus' resurrection, Athanasius does not 
describe the fortress simply as a tomb but as a shrine. The more direct 
comparison that the text offers is one that measures the new ascetical saint 
against the high standard of the martyr, pressing the case for Antony's 
worthiness as holy man. Amazingly, Athanasius portrays Antony as though 
he were a living relic, and so an animated version of the martyr's charis-
matic corpse. "Buried" in the shrine, he is yet salvationally present to the 
faithful who seek him, as were the relics of the martyrs to earlier genera-
tions. Like the martyr, he brings physical and spiritual healing to those who 
approach him in need. Athanasius undoubtedly believes that Antony's 
remarkable discipleship has already garnered God's favorable judgment. 
He possesses the spiritual stature of the martyr even though he did not 
suffer a martyr's death. And yet, Athanasius's justification is riddled with 
eschatological anxiety, the fear that even Antony falls short when mea-
sured against the martyr's established authority. 
Athanasius expresses this anxiety even more directly in his narrative. 
During the persecution of Egyptian Christians under Maximinus in the 
early fourth century, Antony placed himself in danger by ministering to 
those who were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment or forced labor. 
Athanasius describes Antony's bravery in standing by the victims as a 
source of wonder to the prefect who enforced the writ of persecution. 
Athanasius, though, does recognize that Antony's witness fell short of the 
ultimate sacrifice and feels the need to explain: "For, as I said before, he 
also prayed for martyrdom. He seemed, therefore, like one who grieved 
because he had not been martyred, but the Lord was protecting him to 
benefit us and others, so that he might be a teacher to many in the disci-
pline that he had learned from the Scriptures."22 Athanasius confronts the 
problem of the martyr's threatening judgment by offering a more direct 
comparison between martyr and ascetic and an apology for Antony's way 
of life: "When finally the persecution ended, and Peter the blessed bishop 
had made his witness, Antony departed and withdrew once again to the 
cell, and was there daily being martyred by his conscience, and doing battle 
in the contests of faith. He subjected himself to an even greater and more 
strenuous asceticism, for he was always fasting."23 Athanasius invokes 
Ibid. 66. 23 Ibid. 
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martyrdom here as a metaphor for the ascetic's struggle with sin, which, 
given the facts of Antony's life, is the only kind of martyrdom he can 
achieve. The use of the metaphor testifies to the martyr's authority and to 
Athanasius's judgment that, to be a holy man, Antony must wear the 
martyr's mantle in some way. 
This same eschatological anxiety is also evident in a much later hagiog-
raphy, Bonaventure's Life of Francis. Written in 1260, the longer version of 
Francis's life hails the saint as a person of "extraordinary sanctity" and as 
"an example for those who would be perfect followers of Christ."24 Seven 
centuries after Francis's death, Pope Pius XI would officially grant him the 
title alter Christus, "another Christ," but Bonaventure already assumes this 
to be so, and his account of the life did much to earn Francis the formal 
papal honor. Bonaventure describes the saint as a remarkable imitator of 
Jesus, even to the point that Francis performed many of the miracles that 
Jesus worked in the Gospels, including the changing of water into wine.25 
Identification with Christ, Bonaventure tells the reader, was Francis's as-
cetical goal. He "longed to be totally transformed into him by the power of 
ecstatic love" and worked ardently at this task by reliving Jesus' 40-day fast 
in the desert—"secluded in a lonely place, shut up in a cell, with as little 
food and drink as possible, fasting, praying, and praising God without 
interruption."26 But as much as Christ remains the paradigm for Francis's 
spiritual striving in the text, it is interesting to see how Bonaventure re-
gards the martyrs as a measure of Francis's saintly quest, and a threatening 
measure at that. 
Francis's approach to the religious life can only be described as com-
petitive, an observation that Bonaventure specifically offers. He notes that, 
"whenever he saw anyone more poorly dressed than he, Francis immedi-
ately censured himself and roused himself to imitate him, as if he were 
competing in a rivalry over poverty and feared to be beaten by another."27 
Always venturing more in this competition, Francis set out for Syria in his 
sixth year of ascetical practice. His goal, Bonaventure states, was "to 
preach penance and the Christian faith to the Saracens and the infidels."28 
His motivation for making this journey was to meet the high standard set 
by the tradition's earliest saints, for Francis took up this quest "burning 
with a desire of martyrdom,"29 presumably a possible consequence of 
preaching the gospel in the Muslim world. Bonaventure describes this same 
24
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desire as a constant companion to Francis on his evangelical mission: "But 
the fruit of martyrdom had so attracted his heart that he desired a precious 
death for the sake of Christ more intensely than all the merits from the 
virtues."30 We see the same motivation ascribed to Francis in a return to 
the Middle East seven years later in the midst of the dangers of the fifth 
Crusade. Undeterred by threats to the lives of Christians, Francis is por-
trayed by Bonaventure as an "intrepid knight of Christ... not terrified by 
the fear of death, but rather drawn by desire for it."31 
The climax of Francis's hagiography occurs in his reception of the stig-
mata in the last years of his life. Yet, it is interesting to see how this 
profound event unfolds under the specter of the martyr's extraordinary 
sacrifice. Bonaventure depicts Francis's holiness as a context for this re-
markable act of divine favor, and judges his holiness by the achievements 
of his ascetical life. The "man filled with God," Bonaventure testifies, 
"understood that just as he had imitated Christ in the actions of his life, so 
he should be conformed to him in the affliction and sorrow of his pas-
sion."32 Even though Francis's lifelong asceticism has brought him the 
recognition of his religious culture, in his (and Bonaventure's) mind a yet 
higher standard of Christie imitation set by the martyrs judges even the 
most excellent performance of virtue. "And although [Francis's] body was 
already weakened by the great austerity of his past life and his continual 
carrying of the Lord's cross, he was in no way terrified but was inspired 
even more vigorously to endure martyrdom."33 Bonaventure feels com-
pelled to justify Francis before the martyr's complete sacrifice, even as he 
describes the exact moment that Francis received the stigmata and shared 
intimately in the wounds of the cross: "Eventually he understood by a 
revelation from the Lord that divine providence had shown him this vision 
so that, as Christ's lover, he might learn in advance that he was to be totally 
transformed into the likeness of Christ crucified, not by the martyrdom of 
his flesh, but by the fire of his love consuming his soul."34 
It is strange to find that the martyrs proved to be such a threat to the 
tradition's later ascetical saints, even to extraordinary figures like Antony 
and Francis. But so seems the evidence, at least as it is conveyed in the 
judgments of Athanasius and Bonaventure, which are separated in time by 
nearly a millennium. That Athanasius and Bonaventure place their asceti-
cal heroes in competition with the martyrs is testimony to the martyr's 
remarkable achievement and an expression of the eschatological anxiety 
that this achievement stirs in them as they work ardently to fashion their 
own. Our understanding of the late medieval development of the doctrine 
Ibid. 267. 31 Ibid. 268. 
Ibid. 304. 33 Ibid. 304-5. 
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of purgatory, however, requires us to attend to the temporal dimension of 
this competition, particularly to the different ways in which saintly acts 
unfold in time. 
The martyr's defining saintly act transpired in a moment, or, to be exact, 
in however short a time it took for the sufferings of martyrdom to culmi-
nate in death. The martyr's saintly act was threatening not only because it 
imitated the Savior's death so closely but also because the clarity of such 
imitation could shine forth in a single moment in which the ambiguities of 
spiritual struggle and sinful weakness were eternally banished. Even if their 
lives were remembered as extraordinarily virtuous, the martyrs distin-
guished themselves as saints instantly in the act of faithful dying. The 
definitiveness of this temporal moment, and not only the action that filled 
it, stood as a challenge to the ascetical model of saintly practice that flour-
ished in the tradition after the age of persecution. Those aspiring to as-
cetical sainthood found themselves in a spiritual competition with the mar-
tyrs, a competition that in principle they could not win in the course of their 
lives because of two insuperable obstacles. First, the martyr's consummate 
sacrifice transcended imitation since ascetical aspirants soon flourished in 
a Christian culture that celebrated rather than threatened their lives. Sec-
ond, the singularity of the martyr's saintly act was compressed into a brief 
temporal moment that then became timeless. Spiritual achievement so 
impressive that it could be accomplished at once earned an equally instant 
judgment accompanied by the certainty of saintly status. By comparison, 
the ascetical path to sainthood was lifelong and fraught with the uncertain-
ties of self-doubt and moral failure, to say nothing of constant and wanting 
measure against the standard of martyrdom. Even in the hagiographies of 
living saints like Antony and Francis, whose spiritual achievement was 
widely acknowledged and celebrated by their contemporaries, temporal 
duration became a field of eschatological anxiety in which the most worthy 
ascetics continued to compete, always venturing more in order to secure 
the divine judgment they sought. 
COPING WITH THE ASCETICS 
In the Catholic imagination, purgatory is a multivalent place. Its suffer-
ings are portrayed as extreme and mild, physical and psychological, as 
laden with guilt and as occasions of joy. This multivalence extends to the 
scholarly interpretation of purgatory. Philip Aries, for example, calls at-
tention to how purgatory mitigates the power of hell.35 Barbara Newman 
highlights gender issues in the interpretation of purgatory by raising inter-
Ariès, Hour of Our Death 151-54. 
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esting questions about the religious aspirations of medieval women. Re-
minded of Dante's poetic celebration of the desire for heaven on the part 
of purgatorial sufferers, Jacques Le Goff ponders whether another tenable 
alternative to his argument might very well be that purgatory was "more a 
pre-eternity than a post-existence."37 Without any claim for interpretive 
exclusivity, I follow a lead offered by Pierre Chaunu in his intriguing study 
of early modern attitudes toward death in the city of Paris. Here Chaunu 
argues that purgatory negotiates the problem of duration, not only in its 
metaphysical state as a temporal realm but also, and more importantly, in 
the character of its temporality as an extended time defined only by the 
indeterminate events of the Second Coming and the Last Judgment.38 Thus 
I include this notion of duration in my discussion of eschatological anxiety 
in Catholic discipleship. 
As much as historians disagree about when exactly to date the appear-
ance of the doctrine of purgatory, a scholarly consensus has emerged that 
an explicit and widespread belief in purgatory did not develop until the late 
Middle Ages. That belief was accompanied by the first theological reflec-
tions on the place of purgatory in the life of faith and even the first specu-
lations on what life in purgatory was like for the souls who suffered there. 
The doctrine received formal ecclesiastical approval, with varying degrees 
of explicitness, at the Second Council of Lyons (1274), the Council of 
Florence (1438), and the Council of Trent (1563). Even though there is 
mention of otherworldly purgation in Augustine's City of God and a host 
of purgatory-like ideas in the writings of the ancient Church Fathers and in 
early medieval texts, the evidence strongly suggests that the doctrine of 
purgatory developed relatively late in the Catholic tradition. 
It is interesting to consider why this was so. Why did a belief like pur-
gatory, which enjoyed popularity for centuries after its appearance, emerge 
rather late in the tradition? This question is different from Le Goff s, which 
asks what new and particular social circumstances gave rise to the new 
belief and all the practices that attended it. Posing the question of origin 
with appeal to the tradition considers the appearance of new or, at the very 
least, more explicit religious beliefs and practices within a larger network 
of meaning that they serve and promote through the behaviors of those 
who believe and enact them. This religious tradition, of course, is utterly 
36
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woven into all the other strands of culture, and so much so that only the 
most artificial abstraction could configure it idealistically, or as something 
sui generis. And yet, as a dimension of culture with an enduring coherence 
of its own, a religious tradition offers a framework of explanation that is an 
important perspective to consider in accounting for any historical etiology, 
especially those that concern thematically religious instances of origin, like 
the burgeoning late medieval belief in and practice of purgatory. If purga-
tory was a widespread and meaningful belief for Catholic Christians from 
the 12th through the 20th centuries, the question of why its development 
came so late in the tradition is at least as meaningful as the question of why 
purgatory seems to have largely disappeared from Catholic belief and prac-
tice in our own day. I now consider how the traditional trajectory of what 
Peter Brown calls the "peccatization" of the world and what I have called 
the "quotidianizing" of judgment made its way into medieval Catholicism 
in a way that negotiated the eschatological anxiety of the laity. 
I have noted that the martyr's instantaneous virtue and judgment set a 
standard of discipleship that challenged hagiographers as different as Atha-
nasius and Bonaventure. As much as these biographers were convinced of 
the saintly stature of their exemplary ascetics, they still worried that their 
spiritual heroes fell short of the martyr's measure and did all that they 
could to justify their saint in the way they told his story. This tension in the 
hagiographies may or may not have represented the actual feelings of 
Antony and Francis themselves. The writings only allow us to make judg-
ments about the views of their authors. Later Christians counted both 
Athanasius and Bonaventure in the company of the saints. But in their own 
day, the hagiographers were ascetics struggling with the eschatological 
anxiety instigated by the martyr's consummate holiness and which they 
expressed so clearly in their literary defenses of their ascetical masters. 
Martyrs and ascetics were spiritual rivals, though only, of course, in the 
ascetic's retrospective judgment. As the consecrated life became the shape 
of extraordinary discipleship after the age of persecution, the martyr's 
example stood before the ascetic's vows as a practically unreachable goal. 
Every moment in the ascetic's life offered an occasion for reminder that the 
ascetic was not a martyr, and so less holy than the martyr. Time so con-
sidered defined the ascetic's life as a negative field of judgment. And yet, 
the ascetical lifetime also offered a means of negotiating this eschatological 
anxiety. Every moment in the ascetic's life offered an occasion for the 
imitation of Christ. None of these acts could compete with the martyr's 
single act, offered to God in the moment of complete sacrifice. But all these 
acts together, filling the longer temporal duration of an ascetical lifetime, 
could and did justify the holiness of the monastic life and, in extraordinary 
cases, monastic saintliness. Time so considered defined the ascetic's life as 
a positive field of judgment. 
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The development of the doctrine of purgatory can be considered with 
regard to this background, though now as a stage for the relationship 
between the ascetic and the layperson. In his study of relations between the 
living and the dead in the Middle Ages, Patrick Geary offers a succinct 
description of the role of ascetics in their wider social world: 
Monastic communities performed two religious functions vital to medieval society 
at large. First, clerics prayed for the salvation and well-being of the local popula-
tion, particularly their benefactors and supporters. Inclusion in the prayers of the 
religious during one's lifetime and after one's death was a vital concern to a popu-
lation obsessed with the insecurity of this life and the uncertainty of the next. 
Second, through the divine office, the Mass, and the cult of the saints whose relics 
were honored in the community's church, the regular clergy fulfilled the ritual 
actions necessary to keep the spiritual powers benevolently disposed toward human 
society.39 
Monks provided spiritual goods for the laity. But, as Geary notes, lay-
persons provided for the clerics as well, by contributing directly or indi-
rectly to the financial support of their communities. This exchange, how-
ever, was far from equal. The clerics mediated the power of eternal life to 
an eschatologically anxious culture. Clerics possessed this power by virtue 
of their commitment to a consecrated life that, at least in principle, filled 
time with extraordinary acts of discipleship. This difference in vocation, 
and all that attended it, stirred a different sort of eschatological anxiety in 
the wider reaches of the Christian population. The layperson's eschatologi-
cal anxiety was not measured by the martyr but by the ascetic, who now 
stood in medieval culture as a living standard of Christian devotion, of a life 
that was worthy of heavenly reward. 
If the martyr arose in the ascetic's judgment as a daunting spiritual 
competitor, then a certain kind of competitiveness also characterized the 
layperson's relationship with the ascetic. Unlike those who vowed a con-
secrated life, laypersons did not choose to enter the fray of extraordinary 
discipleship. Rather, they found themselves in a system of relationships 
that I call a "hierarchy of discipleship" defined by the valued distinction 
between the clerical life and their own. Within this stratified spirituality, a 
forced competition entered the religious imagination of the layperson that 
was simply a product of vocational difference. Time proved to be an im-
portant dimension of the competitive relationship between the ascetic and 
the layperson, just as it did in the relationship between the ascetic and the 
martyr. The ascetic's entire consecrated life provided a temporal trajectory 
within which a saving judgment could be earned. This extended time 
for virtue negotiated the martyr's instantaneous judgment. The ascetical 
39
 Patrick Geary, Living with the Dead in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University, 1995) 95. 
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lifetime validated its spiritual worthiness through a duration filled with 
virtuous quantity that competed as best it could with the martyr's singular 
act of imitative quality. This same duration, though, validated the ascetic's 
spiritual worthiness with regard to the lower end of the hierarchy of dis-
cipleship. If, as Peter Brown claimed, the peccatization of the world in early 
Catholic Christianity compressed the spiritual portfolio of judgment into 
all the deeds of a lifetime completely embraced in the believer's hour of 
death, then the consecrated life, believers assumed, was especially well 
positioned to meet the demands of divine judgment. This is not to say, of 
course, that believers did not encounter abominably sinful ascetics and 
remarkably saintly laypersons in their day-to-day experience, and take 
account of these anomalies in their eschatological expectations. Yet, the 
vocational difference between ascetics and laypersons defined a competi-
tive field on which, it was assumed, the ascetic had an overwhelming es-
chatological advantage. This advantage worked to soothe the ascetic's anxi-
ety before the martyr, just as much as it provoked the anxiety of the laity 
before religious lives judged in principle to be more. 
The relations in the hierarchy of discipleship described here first ap-
peared as the age of persecution ended in the early fourth century and the 
ascetic took the place of the martyr as the paradigmatic holy person in the 
living experience of the church. The development of the monastic move-
ment in the early Middle Ages and the proliferation of religious orders 
throughout medieval times instantiated the hierarchy of discipleship in the 
Christian worldview, an outlook that embraced not only this world but 
also, I would suggest, the world to come. Perhaps the doctrine of purgatory 
developed slowly and came to popular acceptance rather late in the tradi-
tion, partially at least because its development was a function of the insti-
tutionalization of monasticism, the working of the hierarchy of discipleship 
into the Christian order of things, and, with that hierarchy, the various 
kinds of eschatological anxiety that it stirred in the lives of ascetics and 
laity. Considered from this perspective, the birth of purgatory negotiated 
the eschatological anxiety of the laity by finding a solution to the problem 
of competitive judgment in temporal duration. In a manner similar to the 
ascetic's lifelong lengthening of the temporal field of competition with the 
martyr, belief in purgatory lengthened the layperson's temporal field of 
competition with the ascetic.40 Purgatory allowed the laity to cope with the 
40
 A pious instructional book from the early 20th century explains the duration 
of purgatory in relation to the martyr's instantaneous judgment: "With God's grace 
and man's faithful labour, all these mischiefs can be undone in the end. But we 
cannot wonder if it takes a very long time, and is still uncompleted when death 
comes To our seeing, the new making of our souls is a task for a thousand years. 
But the power and the mercy of God can do it in an instant. The Church sings of 
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eschatological anxiety engendered by the consecrated life by extending 
the time for a satisfactory judgment on one's life into a temporal realm 
beyond death, one limited in duration only by the end of time and the Last 
Judgment—a time that could be described, quite literally, as "all the time 
in the world." 
This vast purgatorial horizon of time allowed for the forced competition 
between ascetics and the laity to be conducted on a more level playing 
field, one that stretched the believer's lifetime of judgment into the oth-
erworld so that time could serve the believer in a way that it may not have 
in the course of earthly life. In some respects, the effect of this temporal 
lengthening allowed the layperson's life to be more like the ascetic's, in 
much the same way that the ascetical paradigm of the saintly life allowed 
the ascetic to be more like the martyr. We see this otherworldly "asceti-
cizing" of the layperson's purgatorial life in several ways. 
First, and minimally, purgatory conflated the layperson and the ascetic in 
their shared need for purgation after death. Accounts of purgatory abound 
in their descriptions of the need for purgatorial suffering on the part of 
monks and nuns. The late twelfth-century French version of St. Patrick's 
Purgatory by Marie de France charts the otherworldly journey of the Irish 
knight Owen, who, though still alive, enters purgatory to witness its terrible 
sufferings. After the tortures of purgatory are detailed in scene after scene, 
a narrator's voice enters the text to deliver a homily on the penitential 
sufferings that compares them to the sufferings of the monastic life: 
Not even cloistered monks 
(Who think they lead a harsh life 
On account of their confinement) 
Know what sort of pains and torments 
Are in the places we have described 
And set before you.41 
the martyrs fitted for heaven Mortis sacrae compendio, by the crowded action of 
their holy death. For what God does slowly through our years of prayer and 
self-denial and suffering is still God's work, not ours" (J. B. McLaughlin, O.S.B., 
Purgatory or the Church Suffering, intro. Patrick J. McCormick [London: Burns, 
Oates, & Washbourne, 1929] 8). And, in a similar vein: "The soul's love for [God] 
could be raised to such intensity as to burn out instantly all other loves, desires, 
attractions. This we believe God does in the souls of his martyrs, who lay down their 
lives for him with a love than which no man hath greater. But in other souls there 
is no reason to suppose such a miracle of grace. It is fitting that they should go 
through the long agony of painfully detaching their souls from the wrong affections 
to creatures which they have willfully and persistently encouraged to take root in 
their souls" (ibid. 29-30). 
41
 Marie de France, Saint Patrick's Purgatory: A Poem by Marie de France, trans., 
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The chiding tone directed toward the monk assures the layperson that even 
the most rigorous forms of ascetical self-denial pale before the sufferings of 
purgatory that nearly all, in the end, will share. In a letter written sometime 
between 1173 and 1179, Hildegard of Bingen relates the extraordinary 
sufferings of a soul in purgatory. Burning in a house consumed by a "fierce 
fire," the punished soul "glowed like red-hot iron," its sufferings greatly 
multiplied by stinging scorpions and devouring boars. Hildegard ends her 
account of the vision by observing that this soul would not be lost to hell 
in spite of its great sins, because "while living in the body, it had been 
disciplined by its superiors in accordance with the Rule, and, by God, 
through physical infirmity."42 The soul enduring such punishments is that 
of a sinful ascetic. 
This same minimal conflation also occurs in Dante's purgatorial sojourn. 
In Canto XVIII, Dante discovers the remarkable penance allotted for the 
sin of sloth—the guilty must run in purgatory without pause. Among the 
moving throng is a soul who apologizes to Dante for his apparent rudeness 
in conversing on the run and who acknowledges both his guilt in deserving 
such punishment and his identity as the Abbott of San Zeno at Verona.43 
Canto XIX relates even more prominent ascetical penance in the realm of 
avarice where Dante encounters Pope Adrian V, who lies prostrate on the 
ground, bound hand and foot, his eyes forced to contemplate the material 
object of his sinful desire. When Dante kneels beside him out of respect for 
his ecclesiastical station, Adrian demurs, "'Straighten your legs, rise up, 
brother,... do not err: I am fellow-servant with you and with the others 
unto one Power.'"44 
As much as these texts conflate the ascetic and layperson by stressing the 
sinfulness of ascetics, few depictions of purgatory undermine the hierarchy 
of discipleship more than the 15th-century A Revelation of Purgatory by an 
unknown woman visionary. The author imagines the ecclesiastical hierar-
chy in purgatory, with all groups distinguished and suffering in particular 
ways. Married men and women are pierced with flaming goads by devils 
who then force-feed them pitch and round out the punishment by drawing 
them apart, "bone from bone."45 Single men and women are roasted on 
42
 Hildegard of Bingen, The Letters of Hildegard of Bingen, 3 vols., trans. 
Joseph L. Baird and Radd K. Ehrman (New York: Oxford University, 2004) 3:163-
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spits and consumed by "adders, snakes, and toads," and then dragged 
through the fire on sharp hooks by devils who complete the torture by 
dismembering their hearts and genitals.46 This account of the suffering of 
laypeople, though, comes later in the text. The author begins by observing 
that in the fire of purgatory is "every kind of pain" imaginable and "every 
sort of Christian man and woman living here in this world, no matter what 
rank they were."47 Of all these ranks, clerics are placed first in the cata-
logue of suffering, not only in their order of appearance in the text but also 
in the degree of their penitential pain. "But among all the pains that I saw 
of all men and women," the visionary claims, " . . . it seemed men and 
women in the ministry of the Church had the greatest pain in that 
sight."48 
Having set the scene of clerical suffering, the visionary immediately 
recounts the appearance of a soul named Margaret, "a sister living in a 
religious house" who pleads for intercessory prayers and masses to end her 
purgatorial suffering. The suffering soul is described as "marked with se-
vere wounds, as though she had been rent with combs," and as "wounded 
and torn." Her heart is rent with "a grievous and horrible wound; from it 
there came sparks, and from her mouth a flame."49 The visionary details 
Margaret's terrible suffering at the hands of devils who align their vile 
torments with particular sins she committed in life. Turning her attention 
to the suffering endured by all in purgatory for particular sins, the visionary 
warns that lechery "was the [sin] most severely chastised, and especially 
that of men and women of Holy Church, whether they were religious or 
secular."50 Devils wield razors to mangle the "heads and prelates of Holy 
Church," whose suffering reaches a crescendo as they are eviscerated for 
betraying their priestly vows.51 And yet, even among the suffering clerics 
there are further distinctions to be made: 
It seemed that religious men and women had a hundred times more pain than 
secular priests and secular women had, for they were cast onto cruel wheels and 
turned about with intense fire, and adders, snakes, and devils were always around 
them. And the devils turned the wheels so fast that I could not see them, but very 
horribly they cried, as if all the world had cried at once. And this pain, father, had 
religious men and women and prelates of Holy Church—more pain than secular 
priests or secular women.52 
The more rigorous the ascetical vows, the more intense the purgatorial 
punishment, an imaginative depiction of the "third place" that utterly in-
47
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verts the earthly hierarchy of discipleship and narrows the judgmental 
distance between ascetics and laypersons.53 
Purgatory allowed the conflation of ascetics and laypersons in another, 
more important way that drew on the Christian belief in the productive 
power of suffering. In this regard, the textual evidence suggests that the 
layperson becomes like the ascetic, and, even more, can become an ascetic 
through purgatorial suffering. 
Striking examples of this ascetical transformation occur in Marie de 
France's St. Patrick's Purgatory. The local bishop counsels the knight 
Owen to prepare for his journey to the underworld by placing himself 
"Among the good men of a monastery, / Or among the canons of a con-
vent; / Then he [Owen] would be more certain to accomplish his pur-
pose."54 A prior who keeps the purgatorial gates, which are an inner door 
of an Irish church, insists that Owen ready himself by remaining in the 
church "for fifteen days, / Fasting and praying, keeping vigils, / And per-
forming acts of mortification."55 The layperson must act like a monk in 
order to face the test of expiation. As Owen enters purgatory and wanders 
"far underground" through ever-increasing darkness, he breaks into a 
"winter light at dusk" that reveals a 
palace [that] had all around it 
One continuous wall, 
Constructed of columns, arches, 
Vaults and wandiches. 
It resembled a cloister, 
Suited for men of religion.56 
The palace seems to be an anteroom to heaven, a place of transition 
between purgatory and eternal glory, though it is clearly still in purgatory 
since a man whom Owen meets inside warns him to "conduct yourself 
bravely, / Or you will perish here" amidst the sufferings that the reader is 
about to encounter outside the palace walls. The speaker is described as 
53
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"the master and prior" of 14 other men who together greet him as he 
enters. The 15 receptionists are portrayed as "Recently shaved and ton-
sured / And dressed in white vestments / . . . / Appearing to be men of 
religion."57 That the monks are "recently" tonsured is especially interest-
ing. They may be so for the unlikely reason that they all died recently as 
novices and have quickly found their way to glory, for it is clear in the text 
that they are in a state of beatitude beyond the sufferings of purgatory. 
Another, more likely, explanation is that their recent tonsuring is the mark 
of their expiation through purgatorial suffering, which, in turn, would sug-
gest that the successful negotiation of purgatory can bring the layperson to 
the ascetical vocation. 
The text does not suggest that expiation always has this effect. In fact, 
later in the account, after Owen has witnessed scene after scene of purga-
torial torture, he enters the earthly paradise that Adam and Eve inhabited 
before the Fall. There he sees all who have met the measure of purgatory 
and who, in the glory and happiness of completed penance, await ascent to 
the celestial paradise above. The layperson is mentioned, which suggests 
that purgatory does not end for all with the profession of monastic vows. 
Yet, even there the layperson moves in the overwhelming company of 
ascetics: 
He also observed religious folk / Walking in procession. / It seemed to him that no 
one had ever seen / Such a splendid procession / Anywhere or at any time, / Nor one 
so nobly arranged. / He saw forms of men and images / Of every age, and like-
wise / Of every order. / Great was that company of folk. / All were differ-
ently attired, / According to their orders. / Some were dressed like archbishops, / 
Others like bishops, / One like an abbot, another like a monk, / A priest, a deacon, 
a canon, / Subdeacon, acolyte, / Or layperson, chosen by God.58 
Clearly, this vision of purgatory's effects makes the ascetical path the stan-
dard of the saved state. The "layperson" is engulfed in the larger proces-
sion otherwise elongated by "religious folk." By walking with them, the 
layperson becomes like them, sharing in the decided majority of their 
redeemed glory and in a way that vocationally elevates the layperson to the 
status of one especially "chosen by God" (laie gent, a Deu eslite).59 
A different version of this asceticizing of the layperson through suffering 
appears in what eventually became the developed theology of purgatory in 
the late Middle Ages. A clear and interesting illustration is Catherine of 
Genoa's Trattato on "Purgation and Purgatory," a transcription of her 
visions that appeared in 1522, twelve years after her death. Whereas Marie 
de France's St. Patrick's Purgatory presents a realm of infernal tortures and 
a hell itself for those whose sins are too great to make expiation and win 
Ibid. 83. 58 Ibid. 133. 
Ibid. 132. 
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release, Catherine imagines a very distinct "third place" whose sufferings 
are joyous because they bring a soul to the glory that God's favorable 
judgment has already secured for it. Catherine's description of these joyous 
sufferings could quite easily be read as an idealized portrayal of the mo-
nastic life, as an account of the same aspirations and goals that motivate 
ascetical renunciation. The souls in purgatory, she avers, are beyond the 
envy of comparison with their peers. "Such is their joy in God's will, in His 
pleasure, that they have no concern for themselves but dwell only on their 
joy in God's ordinance."60 The souls exhibit the virtue of humility in com-
munity, all the while undergoing sufferings that are productive in bringing 
the soul to salvation. "This joy [in the desire for paradise]," Catherine 
states, "increases day by day because of the way in which the love of God 
corresponds to that of the soul, since the impediment to that love is worn 
away daily."61 
Another testimony to the joyful sufferings of purgatory appears in the 
Probation of the late 16th-century Florentine visionary Maria Maddalena 
de' Pazzi. In one of her vivid and "lived" visions, transcribed by her Car-
melite sisters, she wandered the convent garden as though it were purga-
tory, searching for her recently deceased brother. De' Pazzi's purgatory is 
a place of horrible tortures, and yet, when she finds her brother, she is 
pleased to find that his sufferings are delightful: 
That night she was looking for her brother's soul. We understood that because, 
when she stopped, she said: "Oh, where is my little soul? Isn't he here among these 
ones?" And, when she found him, she was very happy and, showing a great joy, she 
spoke to him in a compassionate way: "Poor one, you suffer so much and are still 
very happy? You burn and are so cheerful?"62 
60
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Like Catherine of Genoa, Maria Maddalena de' Pazzi portrays purgatorial 
sufferings as fulfilling. Much in the manner of ascetical denial, they pave a 
path to spiritual perfection that brings the soul to God. Catherine presses 
this identification even further in her treatise. Just as the saintliness of the 
martyrs was defined by terrible suffering and just as the suffering of ac-
complished ascetics like Antony and Francis increased with their degree of 
holiness, so too does Catherine expect the soul in purgatory to know 
greater suffering as it advances in spiritual perfection. "Yet this joy [in 
God's overwhelming love]," Catherine insists, "does not do away with one 
bit of pain in the suffering of the souls in purgatory. As the soul grows in 
its perfection, so does it suffer more because of what impedes the final 
consummation, the end for which God made it; so that in purgatory great 
joy and great suffering do not exclude one another."63 
The record of Catherine's final vision makes the same connections be-
tween the ascetic and the soul in purgatory but does so more directly. Her 
concluding discourse describes the inner disposition of the soul in purga-
tory. And yet, from her words, it is difficult to distinguish between the 
comportment of the disembodied soul and the expected comportment of 
the monk or nun. Casting herself in the role of participant-observer, 
Catherine describes the purgatorial experience as her own, even though, as 
a visionary still alive, she has not passed through the death and divine 
judgment that would bring her into the state of purgation. "I see my soul 
alienated from all spiritual things," she claims, "that could give it solace 
and joy." In this desired state of spiritual acedia, the soul "has no taste for 
the things of the intellect, will, or memory, and in no manner tends more 
to one thing than to another."64 This detachment fosters and finally cul-
63
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initiates in an abandonment of all "things," "places," and "persons" that 
detract from the spiritual path: 
So vehement is the soul's instinct to rid itself of all that impedes its own perfection 
that it would endure hell itself to reach that end. For that reason the soul tena-
ciously sets about casting aside all those things that could give the inner self spe-
cious comfort. It casts out the least imperfection. Cutting itself off from all except 
those who seem to walk the way of perfection, the soul concentrates itself, prefer-
ring not to frequent places where those persons find their pleasure.65 
Now, there are no "things" or "places" in Catherine's purgatory, as there 
are in other late medieval depictions of purgatory. And even though there 
are other "persons" in purgatory, Catherine began her treatise with the 
observation that the suffering souls in purgatory are unaware of each other 
as possible distractions from the consuming fire of God's purifying love.66 
It would seem that Catherine has projected the goals and temptations of 
her own ascetical life into purgatory and has done so to the degree that 
ascetical renunciation has become the descriptive template for other-
worldly purgation. That an ascetic would speak of the otherworld out of 
her own experience is hardly surprising. Yet, we cannot overlook the fact 
that Catherine understands herself to be describing the purgation of all the 
souls that are, or ever have been, or ever will be in purgatory. And since the 
vast majority of these suffering souls were laypersons in their earthly life, 
the vision of purgatory that she presents extends the field of ascetical 
aspiration and accomplishment to laypersons, thus allowing them to 
achieve in purgatory's extended time what they did not in the course of 
their lives. 
All these ways in which the layperson is asceticized in purgatory dimin-
ished the competition between the layperson and the ascetic in the hier-
archy of discipleship. The development of the doctrine of purgatory en-
abled the layperson to cope with the ascetical ideal of saintliness by ex-
tending the time in which divine judgment could be worked out for the 
layperson. The texts I have considered provided the layperson with the 
opportunity to affirm the integrity of the lay state by insisting that layper-
sons were no worse than, and sometimes even better than, ascetics as they 
suffered the purgatorial consequences of divine judgment. Even more, 
what became and remained the developed theology of purgatory from the 
time of Catherine of Genoa to the instructional manuals on purgatory from 
the early 20th century67 enabled laypersons to participate in the ascetical 
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life eschatologically by undergoing sufferings that were joyful and sancti-
fying. It is not surprising that laypersons like Dante and, probably, Marie 
de France would diminish the purgatorial difference between ascetics and 
believers like themselves, since that difference reflected their religious 
disadvantage before the divine judgment. More surprising, perhaps, is the 
fact that depictions of purgatory are largely the work of ascetics who seem-
ingly acted against their religious self-interest by asceticizing purgatorial 
suffering in the ways I have considered. What might account for the will-
ingness of ascetics like Hildegaard, Catherine, and so many others from the 
late Middle Ages to the mid-20th century to diminish their difference from 
the laity in their accounts of purgatory? Or, to pose the question from 
another angle, what advantage did ascetics find in their own contributions 
to the development of the doctrine of purgatory? Several answers together 
might contribute to an understanding. 
First, one should not overlook compassion as a motivation for the 
willingness of ascetics to embrace all the dead into their state of hierarchi-
cal difference. As much as the hierarchy of discipleship encouraged 
ascetics to value their difference from the laity, the preeminent Christian 
virtue insisted on the love of neighbor which, in eschatological perspec-
tive, hoped for the salvation of all. Considered from a more particular 
emotional perspective, the conflation of laypersons and ascetics in purga-
torial suffering allowed ascetics to imagine the assured salvation of their 
family members, from whom they had been distanced by their conse-
crated life. The purgatorial conflation of the lay and ascetical saints derived 
to some degree from a heartfelt commitment to the communion of the 
saints. 
But ascetical self-interest also played a role in the development of the 
doctrine of purgatory. As much as ascetical compassion affirmed the lati-
tude of the communion of the saints, that compassion was only one ingre-
dient in a rich mixture of motivations that included the very strong desire 
to highlight the distinctiveness of the monastic vocation. The ascetical life 
provided a template for purgatorial suffering, since late medieval Chris-
tians simply assumed that the hierarchy of discipleship was true and that its 
redemptive standards had to be negotiated in one way or another. Once the 
late medieval theology of purgatory described its sufferings as joyful and 
spiritually productive, the "third place" became an otherworldly monastery 
that valorized the ascetical life as the surest path to glory. Purgatory's 
ascetical template allowed all its suffering souls to participate in the mo-
nastic life, even though all believers would have assumed that nearly all 
were the souls of laypersons. At the same time, this metaphorical widening 
of the monastic vocation in the afterlife strongly affirmed the authority of 
the ascetical life and its status in the competitive style of religion that itself 
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led to the development of the doctrine of purgatory.68 In addition to this 
self-interest in the realm of religious mentalité, one should not overlook, 
even if it merits only a mention here, the financial benefits that accrued to 
clerics through almsgiving associated with the release of purgatory's suf-
fering souls.6? 
Finally, and most importantly for the argument offered here, purgatory 
allowed ascetics to cope with ascetics. We have seen that all ascetics were 
challenged by the high standard set for the religious life by the martyr's 
extraordinary example and that even the most influential hagiographies— 
the stories of Antony and Francis—made every effort to justify the lives of 
the greatest ascetics before the ancient measure of martyrdom. Catholic 
culture, though, in any time and place is far more familiar with the lives of 
ordinary ascetics, those who have lived a life devoted to the church that, 
like most lives, is a mixture of virtuous and sinful deeds. Ascetics were 
subject to the same kind of eschatological anxiety that coursed through the 
merit system, an anxiety that for most was triggered much more by the 
tradition's saintly ascetics like Antony, Francis, and the founders of orders 
than it was by the martyrs. Purgatory offered ascetics the same advantage 
that it offered to laypersons—a wider field of time in which judgment could 
be adjudicated by productive suffering that drew the soul closer to the 
accomplishments of the greatest saints.70 For most ascetics, the differences 
68
 An interesting example of this monastic authority on purgatory can be found 
in the work of Mechthild of Magdeburg (ca. 1208-ca.l282/94) who barters success-
fully with God for the release of its suffering souls. Mechthild's power over pur-
gatory as a worthy ascetic is sufficient to secure the release of 1,000 souls at once. 
On another occasion, she wins the release of 70,000 souls by offering herself as 
ransom to God. Mechthild of Magdeburg, The Flowing Light of the Godhead, trans, 
and intro. Frank Tobin, pref. Margot Schmidt (New York: Paulist, 1998) 77-78, 
123-24. The same motif is present in the work of Gertrude of Helfta (1256-ca.l301/ 
02) who requests of God the release of suffering souls as numerous as the pieces of 
the fragmented communion wafer in her mouth. God grants her more. Gertrude of 
Helfta, The Herald of Divine Love, trans, and ed. Margaret Winkworth, intro. 
Maximilian Marnau, pref. Louis Bouyer (New York: Paulist, 1993) 183-84. 
69
 Any number of studies are instructive on this point, but especially helpful are 
Jacques Le Goff, Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle 
Ages, trans. Patricia Ranum (Chicago: Zone, 1990) 65-84; Carlos M. N. Eire, From 
Madrid to Purgatory: The Art and Craft of Dying in Sixteenth-Century Spain (New 
York: Cambridge University, 1995; Michelle Bastard-Fournié, "Le purgatoire dans la 
région toulousaine au XlVe et au début du XVe siècle," Annales du Midi (1980) 5-34. 
70
 Eire offers an interesting illustration in his study of 16th-century Spanish be-
quests for the souls in purgatory: "No testator showed a more profound mixture of 
anxiety over the afterlife and confidence in the power of masses than Father 
Gregorio de Oviedo. Calling himself an 'unworthy priest,' this curate sat down with 
a notary while he was still healthy... to write an obsessively detailed will . . . , 
focusing entirely on the business of saving his soul from punishment Father 
Gregorio left his soul as heredera universal, requesting at least 875 masses . . . , plus 
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in the hierarchy of discipleship were as threatening as they were to lay-
persons and so required the balm of purgatorial time in which differences 
between believers mattered less, judgment extended beyond death, and, as 
I will consider in my concluding section, personal virtue that had mattered 
so much in the competitive religion of earthly time now mattered not at all. 
COMPETITIVE RELIGION IN ESCHATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Purgatory's multivalence achieved its otherworldly variety through a 
host of this-worldly interests. Interests defined by social change, class, 
finance, patronage and exchange, ecclesiastical politics, and the desire for 
justice all contributed to the origin and development of purgatory. Here I 
have proposed another layer of explanation that might be added to these 
and other possible causes, namely, anxious longings prompted by tradi-
tional belief in the hierarchy of discipleship. Purgatory temporally 
stretched judgment in order to negotiate the burden of religious competi-
tion in a peccativized Catholic culture, a burden centered in the aspirations 
of ascetics but borne by all the faithful. In this concluding section, I reflect 
theologically on the appearance and disappearance of purgatory in the 
eschatological imagination of Catholic believers. I have already considered 
the appearance of purgatory in all sorts of ways, though there is still one 
more important matter to explore. I have more thoughts regarding the 
disappearance of purgatory in the last 40 years. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the late medieval theology of 
purgatory is the belief that the suffering souls are utterly passive with 
respect to their own state of remediation. They can do nothing to improve 
their condition, diminish their suffering, or shorten their time of purgation. 
Although they have been judged favorably by God and have been assured 
of the beatific vision, the suffering souls can do nothing on their own behalf 
to bring their final state of salvation to completion. Thomas Aquinas ex-
plained the formal metaphysics of this passivity as early as the 13th century. 
Souls separated from their bodies at death, he argues, are immutable, since 
in this state there is no bodily desire to change the soul's enacted disposi-
tion toward its ultimate end, whether toward eternal beatitude or toward 
eternal damnation. Beyond death, the soul dwells "in a state of rest in the 
end acquired,"71 an inactivity that characterizes the souls in purgatory as 
certain other clusters of masses. In addition, he asked with customary redundance 
that after all the appropriate fees had been paid for these, the remainder of his 
estate 'all be spent in pious works and alms for my soul I want it all spent on 
masses, sacrifices, and pious works'" (Eire, From Madrid to Purgatory 193). 
71
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 4 vols., vol. 4, Salvation, trans. C. J. 
O'Neil (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1975) 344. 
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much as it does the saints in heaven and the damned in hell. This position 
accounts for the finality and unchangeability of God's judgment on every 
life immediately upon death. After all, if souls could change in their dis­
position toward their final end, then God's judgment could be undone. 
And yet, even though God's judgment cannot be undone in any of the 
three otherworldly places, purgatory is a realm where the soul's "state of 
rest" is as much a matter of its passivity as of its immutability. 
Catherine of Genoa described the inactivity of purgatorial suffering in a 
manner that became authoritative for the later tradition. The souls in 
purgatory, she claims, dwell "only on their joy in God's ordinance, in 
having Him do what He will."73 "Content in God's will" and having none 
of their own, the souls only feel "sorrow over their sins"7 4 and lack any 
trace of ego or sense of competition with their fellow souls: "These souls 
cannot think, Ί am here, and justly so because of my sins,' or Ί wish I had 
never committed such sins for now I would be in paradise,' or 'That person 
there is leaving before me,' or Ί will leave before that other o n e . ' . . . Such 
is their joy in God's will, in His pleasure, that they have no concern for 
themselves."75 In Catherine's vision, the soul relinquishes itself to its suf­
fering, which it "willingly accepts as a mercy."7 6 God is utterly the agent of 
the soul's purgation. "In so acting," she testifies, "God so transforms the 
soul in Him that it knows nothing other than God; and He continues to 
draw it up into His fiery love . . . [where it] feels itself melting in the fire of 
that love of its sweet God." 7 7 Insisting most pointedly on the soul's pas­
sivity in all this, Catherine confesses that "if we are to become perfect, the 
change must be brought about in us and without us; that is, the change must 
be the work not of man but of God." 7 8 
Catherine's sensibilities on the passivity of the souls in purgatory pre­
vailed throughout the later tradition, as far as the pastoral treatises of the 
early and mid-20th century. And yet, they did not prevail without contest. 
In his homiletic manual entitled The Poor Souls in Purgatory, Paul 
Wilhelm von Keppler, bishop of Rottenburg at the turn of the 20th century, 
insists that the souls in purgatory are "sentenced to a state of inactivity, 
7 2
 Ibid. 342. 
7 3
 Catherine of Genoa, Purgation and Purgatory 71. 
7 4
 Ibid. 72, 75. 7 5 Ibid. 71. 
7 6
 Ibid. 78. 7 7 Ibid. 79. 
7 8
 Ibid. 81. This stance on the passivity of the suffering souls is affirmed in 
another 16th-century treatise by Cardinal William Allen, originally published in 
1565: "Let us be circumspect therefore, and work while the day is here; for in the 
night or the next world sinners cannot help themselves, nor work one moment 
towards their own delivery or release" (Allen, Souls Departed: Being a Defence and 
Declaration of the Catholic Church's Doctrine Touching Purgatory and Prayers for 
the Dead, ed. T. E. Bridge«, C.Ss.R. [1565; London: Burns & Oates, 1886] 160). 
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which, however, is not a state of rest, but full of restlessness and an eager 
desire to act."79 Quite unlike Catherine, who touted the joyfulness of pur-
gatorial passivity, Keppler ever accentuates the anguish of the souls in their 
inability to act, a motif that highlights the terrible loss of free choice in a 
religion that prizes meritorious action as the path to God. "In this state of 
passivity," Keppler declares, "the Poor Souls must feel doubly that painful 
want of the sacramental graces which were at their disposal during life. On 
earth, they were able to draw graces to themselves . . . which would 
have. . . secured their immediate salvation."80 And now, in purgatorial 
time, such opportunities have vanished. Martin Jugie, a French theologian 
who flourished in the mid-20th century, agrees with Catherine that "there 
can be no question of merit after death" and that "after death, the soul 
does not change."81 Jugie, though, was deeply suspicious of any explana-
tion that would make purgatorial sufferings "a purification only,"82 a view 
that to his mind would overlook the charitable actions of which the suf-
fering souls are capable. Unlike Catherine, who maintains that the suffer-
ing souls are unaware of each other in the purifying power of divine love, 
Jugie sees purgatory as a region of "perfect fraternal charity." The "doing" 
of the souls, however, is limited to their praying for each other and for the 
living,83 an activity that Jugie carefully laces with the passivity traditionally 
expected of the suffering souls. The prayers of the souls for others, he 
insists, lack "satisfactory value" or the possibility of merit and possess only 
"impetratory force, the proper efficacy of prayer considered in itself." For 
Jugie, the act of intercessory prayer in purgatory seems to be meager to the 
point of inaction. "It could be compared," he says, "to the gesture of a poor 
man who holds out his hand to a rich,"84 an analogy bent on asserting the 
79
 Keppler, Poor Souls in Purgatory 76. The counterposition is clearly expressed 
in an earlier work by Henry James Coleridge, S.J., that is much closer to the typical 
view of passivity: "This calm and peace [of those who die in a state of grace] is not, 
in the case of the Holy Souls, a passing, but a permanent state, it lasts as long as they 
remain in the holy prison of Purgatory This peace of the holy state of Purgatory 
is as true and real an element in the condition of those souls . . . as is the pain which 
they suffer and the length of time for which it may last" (Coleridge, Prisoners of the 
King: Thoughts on the Catholic Doctrine of Purgatory [London: Burns & Oates, 
1878] 164). 
80
 Keppler, Poor Souls in Purgatory 78. 
81
 Martin Jugie, Purgatory and the Means to Avoid It, trans. Malachy Gerard 
Carroll (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950) ii, 2. 
82
 Ibid. 11. 83 Ibid. 41. 
84
 Ibid. 42. A pious book from the early 20th century shows his same tension 
between the passivity and activity of the suffering souls. The French Marianist H. 
Faure portrays purgatory as a place of the "most profound, the most absolute 
peace" and its inhabitants as souls "in pressing need.. . [who] cannot help them-
selves." And yet, he tells many stories of the souls interceding in earthly life on 
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passivity of the penitent dead even in the midst of an argument for a 
residue of their activity. 
In spite of their nuanced differences, these views on the passivity of the 
dead in purgatory consistently represent the same concerns. First and fore-
most, passivity in purgatory reflects the metaphysics of judgment that 
Aquinas articulated so clearly and that extends throughout all three di-
mensions of the otherworld. The eternal judgment of God constrains what 
the saved and the damned may do to the same degree that it constrains 
what they may be. In this traditional worldview, both eternal joy and 
eternal suffering are passive reactions to objective, supernatural condi-
tions: respectively, the beatific vision and the torments of hell. Purgatorial 
passivity is an odd mixture of both joy and suffering, though both emotions 
here too are passive reactions to an immutable divine judgment still in a 
temporal process of being fulfilled. Second, the passivity of the souls in 
purgatory was vital to the practice of intercession on the part of the church 
militant, the faithful in life who enacted the values of ascetical culture on 
behalf of those in purgatory, including the suffering souls they assumed 
they would one day be. This passivity is important even to a theorist like 
Jugie, who is reluctant to relinquish all doing on the part of the suffering 
souls so that his purgatory retain some semblance of ascetical virtue while 
yet insisting with the tradition that purgatorial acts bring no merit to their 
agents. 
In line with the argument presented here, I would suggest another di-
mension of purgatorial passivity that might aid in explaining both the ori-
gins of the doctrine and its recent disappearance. I have observed that a 
contributing factor to the development of the doctrine of purgatory may 
have been an effort on behalf of all the faithful to negotiate the competitive 
style of religion that gravitated around the ascetic's vocation. Purgatory, I 
have suggested, tempered the eschatological anxiety that permeated the 
Catholic culture of works by allowing the laity to be the ascetical sufferers 
that they were not and ascetics to be better ascetical sufferers than they 
were, all within a protracted time of judgment that lowered the bar—and 
the anxiety—of competitive religion. It would be interesting to consider 
that the passivity of the suffering souls is a further negotiation of this 
anxiety. As much as believers imagined purgatory as a supernatural mon-
astery, they insisted, paradoxically, that it be portrayed as a place where the 
suffering souls were passive, unable to engage in the very behavior so 
competitively valued in the ascetical culture of Catholic Christianity. The 
behalf of their devotees. Faure assumes, though, that these supernatural deeds are 
what we might call "passively" charitable actions, since they gain no merit. H. 
Faure, The Consolations of Purgatory, trans. W. Humphrey Page (New York: Ben-
ziger, 1912) 81,136,165-71. 
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passivity of purgatory affirmed the finality of divine judgment and fostered 
the ascetical values of the merit system by placing the suffering souls in 
need of intercession. But perhaps another layer of explanation is that the 
passivity of the suffering souls expressed the heartfelt desires of all believ-
ers for the end of competition and the quelling of the eschatological anxiety 
that issued from life in a peccativized world. Viewed from one angle, the 
passivity of purgatory anticipated the eschatological goal of heavenly rest. 
Considered, though, from the perspective of the development of doctrine, 
the passivity of purgatory expressed deep religious yearnings for inaction 
before a divine judgment already rendered and certain, even if not quite 
completed. Purgatory, so understood, was a place of struggle where the 
prevailing values of the entire system of belief were at once encoded and 
deconstructed, figuratively canonized and subverted, and, in the complex-
ity of Catholic faith, both accepted and rejected. 
Admittedly, this is a speculative interpretation, but one that might be 
justified if measured against the backdrop of the religious emotions 
competitively at work in Catholic Christianity. Thus regarded, the pas-
sivity of the suffering souls negatively conveys a rebellious desire that 
contributed to the development of the doctrine of purgatory. One way to 
test the coherence of this interpretation is to see how the doctrine of 
purgatory behaves in the absence of competitive religion. My hypothesis 
in this experiment must be that purgatory disappears where competi-
tive Christianity is not the regnant style of faith. Two historical sites will 
serve as my testing grounds: the Christian culture of 16th-century Lutheran 
and Reformed Protestantism and one strain of post-Vatican II Catholic 
faith. 
At first glance it seems as though my argument leads to the conclusion 
that the purgatorial desire for passive quiescence before the divine judg-
ment was a seed of the Reformation that blossomed in the Protestant 
doctrine of grace alone. Certainly the Catholic belief in the passivity of the 
suffering souls and the Lutheran and Reformed belief in grace alone share 
a similar desire for a completed salvation where God's will prevails over all 
human initiative. Both beliefs acknowledge a state in which human help-
lessness surrenders before the divine judgment. At most, perhaps, one 
could understand the Lutheran and Reformed traditions to have expressed 
this general Christian desire in a host of determinately doctrinal ways. The 
differences between the Catholic and Protestant beliefs in passivity before 
God, though, are far more striking. The Lutheran and Reformed traditions 
moor this passivity in a doctrine of predestination, which places God's 
saving decision in eternity and makes all human actions worthless sins in 
the eyes of God. Catholic Christianity consistently has judged a strong 
doctrine of predestination to be religiously unacceptable. The medieval 
Catholic tradition rejected it first in the later work of Augustine, even as it 
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accepted so many other features of Augustine's theology and person as 
utterly authoritative. And since the Council of Trent, modern Catholicism 
has decisively rejected the Protestant claim for eternal election, finding the 
doctrine's denial of the efficacy of free choice and natural responsibility for 
virtue as well as for sin to be inconsistent with its theological understanding 
of the human person.85 The Catholic yearning for passivity before divine 
judgment is not a desire for the certainty of the eternal decree but rather 
a desire for tranquility in the face of a particular kind of eschatological 
anxiety that has achieved its meaning in the context of moral, and even 
saintly, struggle. 
The Reformation doctrine of grace alone provides a relevant point of 
comparison with the passivity of the suffering souls especially because its 
acceptance entailed the rejection of the competitive religion of the medi-
eval Catholic tradition and the doctrine of purgatory that developed from 
it. The doctrine of sola gratia subverted the religious value of the ascetical 
life, which, I have shown, was the center and energy of Catholic competi-
tion. The Reformation understanding of grace as sheer divine gift meant 
that the ascetic's vocation was misdirected and, even more, an exercise in 
vanity, since grace could not be earned. That same judgment extended to 
the ordinary discipleship of the laity, who strove for a salvation measured 
by the ascetical standard. And finally, that same judgment extended to the 
doctrine of purgatory, which negotiated in complex ways the eschatological 
anxiety that attended this competitive style of religion.86 For Luther, "pur-
gatory and all the pomp, services, and business transactions associated with 
it are to be regarded as nothing else than illusions of the devil, for purga-
tory, too, is contrary to the fundamental article that Christ alone, and not 
the work of man, can help souls."87 In the Institutes, Calvin puts his dis-
missal in the form of a rhetorical question: "But if it is perfectly clear from 
our preceding discourse that the blood of Christ is the sole satisfaction for 
the sins of believers, the sole expiation, the sole purgation, what remains 
85
 "The Decree on Justification, Council of Trent," in Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils, 2 vols., ed. Norman P. Tanner, S.J. (Washington: Georgetown University, 
1990) 2:676, 672 (chaps. 12, 5). 
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 This disdain for purgatory, however, does not mean that the mainline 
Reformation churches did not have their own version of eschatological anxiety, 
one peculiar to a "grace alone" style of faith and attended by its own kind of 
competition. The Reformation of 16th-century Zürich and Geneva are likely 
sites for evidence of Protestant versions, as is the theological and cultural evidence 
Max Weber enlists in his classic work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, foreword R. H. Tawney (New York: Scribner, 
1958). 
87
 Martin Luther, "Smalcald Articles" II.2, in The Book of Concord: The Con-
fessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Theodore G. Tappert (Phila-
delphia: Fortress, 1959) 295. 
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but to say that purgatory is simply a dreadful blasphemy against Christ?' 
If Reformation sensibilities teach the formal lesson that purgatory disap-
pears where strong grace prevails, then perhaps we have some direction for 
understanding the remarkable loss of belief in purgatory since Vatican II. 
As I begin to assess my second historical site for the disappearance of 
belief in purgatory, it is important to note that the doctrine has not disap-
peared entirely from contemporary Catholic culture. A tradition is always 
a constellation of beliefs and practices being made and remade in every 
passing moment. Its variety and diversity are as characteristic as the unity 
that believers claim for it. Within this diversity, some Catholics still believe 
in purgatory ardently enough to participate in all the practices associated 
with engaged belief in the "third place." And yet, purgatory has largely 
disappeared from Catholic belief and practice in the past half century, a 
phenomenon that begs for theological explanation.89 My introductory re-
88
 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 1 of 2, Library of Christian 
Classics 20, trans. Ford Lewis, ed. John T. McNeill Battles (Philadelphia: West-
minster, 1977) 676 (3.5.6). 
89
 Guillaume Cuchet documents an interesting rise in purgatorial devotions in 
France from the 19th century to World War I, after which the same practices wane 
considerably. The title of his book portrays the waning as the "twilight" of purga-
tory, which may be appropriate as a metaphor if the virtual loss of purgatorial belief 
and practice after Vatican II is conceived as a far more advanced nightfall. See 
Guillaume Cuchet, La crépuscule du purgatoire (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005). 
Yet, documenting the disappearance of belief in purgatory is difficult. Sociologi-
cal and historical studies of Catholic belief and practice since the council so com-
pletely assume its disappearance that it is not considered to be an illuminating site 
of investigation. The Gallup Poll Index from 1935-1997 makes no mention of 
purgatory (Alec M. Gallup, The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Public Opinion 
1935-1997 [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999] 82-84). No mention 
of purgatory appears in the following excellent studies of postconciliar American 
Catholicism: Chester Gillis, Roman Catholicism in America (New York: Columbia 
University, 1999); Dean R. Hoge, et al., Young Adult Catholics: Religion in the 
Culture of Choice (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 2001); James M. 
O'Toole, ed., Habits of Devotion: Catholic Religious Practice in Twentieth-Century 
America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2004). A personal story here might 
illustrate the experience of late middle-age Catholics who can still remember the 
power of purgatory in the preconciliar Church. In the year 2000, my parish church 
in Trumbull, Connecticut, was designated one of several churches in the diocese 
where one could fulfill the conditions of a plenary indulgence to celebrate the 
Jubilee Year. The indulgence, of course, is meaningful in Catholic belief only as a 
remission of purgatorial punishment. And yet, there had been no homiletical talk 
of purgatory in the parish for decades. An explanation of the Jubilee-Year indul-
gence from the pulpit made every effort to affirm its earning as a good and virtuous 
thing without saying what it was exactly or mentioning its connection to purgatory 
at all. The assumption on the part of the homilist, I believe, was that younger 
members of the congregation would not know what purgatory was and that older 
members had long left it behind. 
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marks noted that one reason for the disappearance of belief in purgatory 
might lie in the way that theological and pastoral reception of Vatican II 
highlighted the power of God's grace, and to a degree that undermined the 
detailed accounting of personal virtue and sin in the Tridentine merit sys-
tem. I conclude by reflecting on this observation in light of my lengthy 
argument. 
Even though conservative interpreters of Vatican II stress the un-
changed continuity of its teaching with previous tradition, it is difficult to 
explain the extensive developments in Catholic belief and practice after the 
council as much to do about the same or, as conservatives are more inclined 
to hold, a series of misinterpretations of what the council really taught. 
Lumen gentium's teachings on the universal call to holiness and the com-
mon priesthood of all the faithful challenged believers to reimagine the 
meaning of the traditional notion of the hierarchy of discipleship in a way 
that accentuated the baptismal vocation of all believers.90 This ecclesiol-
ogy, complemented by the same document's teaching on salvation outside 
the church and the church's embrace of the modern world in Gaudium et 
spes, encouraged believers to envision God's grace as efficacious beyond 
the means of the institutional church, a view supported by the influence of 
Rahner's theology on and after the council. The postconciliar emphasis on 
the availability of God's grace had a host of effects on Catholic belief and 
practice. It depeccativized the world. It dulled the pointed sense of God's 
judgment that believers felt upon their lives. It calmed the eschatological 
anxiety that had filled Catholic lives throughout the earlier tradition. It 
subverted the advantage that the ascetical vocation had found in the hier-
archy of discipleship. And, finally, it caused the virtual disappearance of 
belief in purgatory as the tradition's late-developing and creative way of 
negotiating a sinful world, God's judgment, eschatological anxiety, and the 
burden of the ascetical vocation in the hierarchy of discipleship.91 
As interesting as I find Richard Fenn's thesis that belief in purgatory has not 
disappeared but has become quotidian in secularized American life, I think that he 
has stretched the purgatorial metaphor to the breaking point. See Richard K. Fenn, 
The Persistence of Purgatory (New York: Cambridge University, 1995). My 
judgment that belief in purgatory has disappeared in the life of the church 
is a sociological one. I have no qualms about believing in the reality of the "third 
place." 
90
 The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church {Lumen gentium) nos. 9-17, in 
Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, ed. Austin Flan-
nery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.: Costello, 1987) 359-69. 
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The loss of belief in purgatory, then, was the loss of competitive religion, 
a loss cheered by some in the Catholic Church, lamented by others, and 
unconsciously lived out by so many more. Where the loss of competitive 
religion has entailed the believer's oblivion to meaningful guilt and a sense 
of judgment in the face of personal and systemic sin, there something of 
value has vanished from the tradition and is in desperate need of recovery. 
But the loss of competitive religion can also be understood as an authentic 
development in the tradition, a loss that brings the possible gain of a novel 
style of Catholic faith that we could describe as "noncompetitive." Al-
though a number of sociological rubrics have been proposed to name the 
many ways of being Catholic since the council, I have not encountered the 
rubric "noncompetitive," which I offer not as a sociological but as a theo-
logical description that cuts across a number of Catholic behaviors that 
might be distinguished from the competitive religiosity of earlier Catholic 
belief and practice. For help in elucidating this Catholic style of faith, 
I enlist the important work of Kathryn Tanner. 
As Tanner has argued, a noncompetitive understanding of Christian life 
is one deeply attuned to the graciousness of God as the giver of the gift that 
grace is. Since God's gifts are truly gifts and not entries into a system of 
barter and exchange, they cannot be returned through reciprocal action on 
the part of the graced. By their very nature, God's gifts dash any possibility 
of conditional reciprocity precisely because the persons who receive them 
are themselves created gifts: 
God's gifts efface themselves in their giving because God's gift-giving, unlike any 
gift-giving among creatures with which we are familiar, is total, productive without 
remainder of its recipients. Because we are these gifts, we are not aware of having 
received them, as we would be in any ordinary case of gifts transferred from 
someone else's hands to us. Recognition of these gifts is itself, then, a gift from 
God.92 
And if even an appreciative faith is a divine gift, then no conditional 
return to God is expected or even possible. For Tanner, God's un-
conditional giving communicates the divine life itself, shared as acts of 
complete self-giving without return among the persons of the Trinity. 
God's utter graciousness is simply who God is, as much as it is what God 
does. 
image of salvation as divinization are avenues to pursue in explaining the Eastern 
suspicion of the belief. For a historical account of the theological differences be-
tween East and West on purgatory, see Gilbert Dagron, "La perception d'une 
différence: Les débuts de la 'Querelle du Purgatoire,'" Actes du XVe Congrès 
International d'Études Byzantines: Athènes, Septembre 1976 (1980) 84-92. 
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Understanding God's being and acting in this way means that "God's 
gift-giving is non-competitive." God's giving to one does not come at an-
other's expense. "What is given," Tanner explains, "remains the possession 
of the one giving."93 Grace is not a commodity that can be transferred to 
and then possessed by the recipient since the graced person, in the act of 
creation, is a divine gift too, and not some personal site for the exchange of 
value with God or other competing persons. God's giving does not work in 
that way. And even though so much giving and receiving in the world does, 
Tanner insists that a proper theological regard for the human person would 
recognize the Christian obligation to imitate the manner of God's noncom-
petitive gift-giving, which sets the standard for true relations in all of cre-
ation. "If our lives together imitate God's giving to us," Tanner argues, "we 
should not need to hold what we are or have as our exclusive possessions, 
or claim with respect to them exclusive rights of use, against others."94 
When owning becomes a function of giving, as it does in the act of creation, 
possession and rights of use relinquish any sense of propriety and become 
the common currency of all. And this means that 
our lives as individuals should be constituted and enhanced in their perfections as 
we share our lives with others in community, identifying ourselves thereby as 
persons in community with others and not simply persons for ourselves. We perfect 
one another in community as our operations to perfect our own gifts and talents 
enter into and supplement the operations of others in a combined venture for goods 
otherwise impossible.95 
Such "relations of non-exclusive possession and identification only make 
sense . . . , " Tanner insists, "where giving to others and having oneself are 
not in competition with one another."96 
Tanner's reflections clearly lead in the direction of a social ethic, which, 
while very important, is not my principal concern here.97 Nevertheless, her 
thoughts on grace are a suggestive resource for explaining the present 
Catholic moment. If a noncompetitive style of Catholic faith has appeared 
in the wake of Vatican II, then Tanner's theology seems to suggest that it 
derives from a strong emphasis on the power of grace and an appreciation 
on the part of believers that the efficacy of grace devalues religious com-
petition. Without competition among believers for a favorable divine judg-
ment, all the dynamics of the hierarchy of discipleship dissolve away, and 
with them some of the typical forms of Catholic belief and practice that 
have flourished throughout Catholic history. For some in the Catholic 
Church, this change in belief and practice constitutes a fateful loss. Yet, 
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with this noncompetitive style of faith comes a host of possible gains to the 
tradition. The loss of competitive religion may have resulted in a paucity of 
vocations to the ascetical life, but the rise of a noncompetitive style of faith 
has witnessed a new appreciation for the baptismal responsibilities of all 
believers. The loss of competitive religion may have diminished the prac-
tice of auricular confession, but the rise of a noncompetitive style of faith 
may have increased Catholic devotion to the Eucharist and its reception, 
perhaps the clearest ritualistic expression of a noncompetitive Catholic 
sensibility. The loss of competitive religion may have resulted in a loss of 
devotion to the saints and their heroic spiritual achievements, but the rise 
of a noncompetitive style of faith may have led to a new awareness of the 
social dimension of Catholic ethics in an increasingly globalized world. The 
loss of competitive religion may have resulted in the collapse of a Matthean 
style of faith, but the rise of a noncompetitive style of faith may have 
recovered Pauline dimensions of the Catholic tradition that have been too 
long overlooked. 
A possible objection to this account of novel development in recent 
Catholic tradition is that it makes Tanner's theology of grace a template of 
explanation, one that requires Catholic anthropology and ecclesiology to fit 
the Procrustean bed of a classically Protestant theology of grace. But Tan-
ner's stance is not classically Protestant. Its insistence on a noncompetitive 
understanding of grace and the Christian life seems to entail the rejection 
of a doctrine of double predestination, a rejection on which a Catholic 
theology of grace will always rightly insist. Moreover, Tanner's theology of 
grace does not undermine the believer's responsibility for his or her words 
and deeds in the face of divine judgment. As important as these words and 
deeds are, though, for the faithful Christian life, they do not enter into a 
system of exchange with God or into competition with others that would 
make grace a commodity instead of a gift. "God's giving is not owed to 
creatures," Tanner states, " but if those gifts are being given uncondition-
ally by God to all in need, creatures are in fact owed the goods of God by 
those ministering such benefits, without being or having done anything in 
particular to deserve them. Our good works, in short, are not owed to God 
but they are to the world."98 This understanding of the relationship be-
tween grace and works thoroughly respects the teaching of the Council of 
Trent that human initiative comes at the prompting of grace and yet our 
works are freely chosen and matter for our salvation, not as merit but as 
acts that imitate, however minimally, God's noncompetitive gift-giving. 
This understanding of grace and works also opens some promising avenues 
for an interpretation of the communion of saints in the pluralistic world in 
which we live. 
Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity 89. 
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If a desire for the end of competitive religion inhabited purgatory in the 
passivity of the suffering souls, then perhaps that desire continues to live on 
even in purgatory's absence, ironically in a postconciliar style of faith that 
is typically blamed for purgatory's disappearance. Whether a noncompeti-
tive style of Catholic faith can endure and thrive as the tradition to come 
depends on whether an authentic Catholicism is possible without an as-
cetical center of gravity for the pressing soteriological issues of time and 
judgment. It is interesting to consider that the late medieval blossoming of 
purgatory coincided with the rise of Western individualism. Perhaps the 
competitive élan of the hierarchy of discipleship was energized even more 
by that cultural event and translated imaginatively into the extended time 
of purgatorial judgment for the individual believer. Catholic believers will 
always and rightly be concerned about their individual judgment. A non-
competitive style of faith, though, may be more inclined to broaden that 
concern to include all peoples and all of history. In this theological per-
spective, salvation is as much a corporate as it is an individual event, and 
the time of history is as important for negotiating the salvation of the 
human community as the supernatural time of purgatory has been for 
negotiating God's judgment on individual believers in light of the ascetical 
standard. A noncompetitive Catholic faith, then, is rife with eschatological 
implications for the ancient traditional belief in the Last Judgment and the 
communal proportions of salvation. 
No doubt, a noncompetitive eschatology will be attended by its own 
brand of anxiety, as will any account of the Christian life that is serious 
about judgment. But it will be an anxiety shared by believers who trouble 
about their undeserved reception of God's innumerable gifts. This will not 
be an anxiety stirred by the competitive envy of the least who aspire to be 
the most, but rather an anxiety disturbed by the sinful possibility of com-
petition for God's favor in a community of solidarity rightly appreciative of 
God's graceful subversion of competitive judgment. 
